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ABSTRACT 
 
 
REITS: DUAL ASSET MARKETS AND “ARBITRAGE” 
 
BY 
 
DONGSHIN KIM 
 
APRIL 8, 2016 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Jonathan A. Wiley 
Major Academic Unit: Department of Real Estate 
 
Dual asset markets are unique to real estate. When the assets are held by a real estate investment 
trust (REIT), properties trade in property markets while claims on cash flows from these assets 
trade in a public equity market. If the two parallel markets are in disagreement regarding the total 
market value of underlying assets, then REIT managers are faced with inter-market arbitrage 
opportunities. If a REIT’s shares trade at premium in the stock market relative to the net asset 
value (NAV) of the underlying assets, the arbitrage opportunity can be exploited by issuing new 
equity in the stock market and purchasing assets in the property market with the proceeds from 
new equity. If a REIT’s shares trade at a discount to NAV, the arbitrage opportunity is achieved 
by selling assets in the local property market and repurchasing shares of common equity. In this 
dissertation, I investigate whether REIT managers attempt to exploit such opportunities. 
Specifically, I identify whether share price premiums or discounts to NAV influence the propensity 
vi 
 
of REIT managers to purchase versus sell assets in the property market. In addition, I investigate 
whether the market-wide premiums to NAV influence the relative transaction prices paid for the 
property while carefully controlling for the sample selection issue in the analyses. Further, since 
this information is feasible to evaluate by analysts, I investigate how investors in the stock market 
react when REIT managers issue new equity during periods of premiums to NAV. The analyses 
use property level transaction data for commercial real estate asset values and stock price data for 
REITs. 
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CHAPTER ONE ─ INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Real estate assets are potentially traded in two parallel markets. In the local property market, 
individual assets are traded directly among private parties. At the same time, in the public equity 
market, claims on cash flows from these assets are traded as equity shares in real estate investment 
trust (REIT) stock ownership. Unlike most other industries, here property market transaction 
information is available, and analysts are effectively able to mark the underlying asset to market 
value to estimate the net asset value (NAV) of a REIT (market value of underlying assets minus 
outstanding liabilities). 
Often times, asset valuations differ across the two parallel markets. Industry data is readily 
available to confirm the extent of disagreement between the dual asset markets (Figure 1). The 
inter-market pricing differential is usually measured by the premium/discount to NAV (PNAV), 
which is the share price to NAV ratio minus one. During most periods, the two markets are 
inconsistent in their valuation of the underlying assets. When the PNAV is positive (i.e., premium 
to NAV), the public equity market values the underlying assets higher than the property markets. 
On the other hand, when the PNAV is negative (i.e., discount to NAV)1, the public equity market 
places a lower value on the underlying assets than property markets.  
 
  
                                                 
1 In this paper, premium/discount to NAV (PNAV) refers “price/NAV – 1” which can range from negative to 
positive values. Positive PNAV is distinguished by the term “premium to NAV”; negative PNAV is distinguished 
by “discount to NAV”. 
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Figure 1 ■ Market-wide Average Premium to NAV. 
 
Source: Green Street Advisors. 
Note: This figure displays the monthly average REIT share price premium/discount to NAV 
(PNAV) for all REITs. PNAV is defined as price/NAV-1. 
 
 Previous research has considered the existence of dual asset markets and the pricing 
differentials in the context of causes of the pricing differentials (e.g., Capozza and Lee 1995; 
Barkham and Ward 1999; Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer 2003; Brounen, Ling and Prado 2013), 
while others have focused on consequence of pricing differentials for capital structure decisions 
of REIT managers (Boudry, Kallberg and Liu 2010). 
However, the dual asset market characteristic of real estate brings up another interesting 
question that is yet to be explored: Is inter-market arbitrage viable? The arbitrage strategy is 
explained in Geltner, Miller, Clayton and Eichholtz (2014). Theoretically, when the public equity 
market favors the real estate securities with a premium to NAV, REIT managers can take 
advantage of “arbitrage” opportunities by issuing new equity shares in the stock market and 
purchasing assets in the property market. On the other hand, when the stock market is unfavorable 
to real estate securities and shares trade at a discount to NAV, REIT managers can exploit 
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“arbitrage” by selling assets in the property market and using the proceeds from asset sales to 
repurchase outstanding equity shares. In addition, managers may elect to take action at the firm 
level instead of transacting individual properties in order to exploit the mispricing between the two 
asset markets. If higher share prices are expected relative to NAV, a private real estate firm can go 
public, effectively selling the entire portfolio in the public market at a higher price. On the other 
hand, if a publicly-listed REIT has shares trading at discount to NAV, the firm may become a 
desirable merger and acquisition (M&A) target with the sum of the individual assets being 
collectively worth more than the sum of the equity and debt claims. Such outcomes would only be 
true arbitrage opportunities in a world without uncertainty and transactions costs. The word 
“arbitrage” is used loosely here, since commercial real estate transactions are inherently risky. The 
pricing differential is only an approximation of the true value. Also, real estate transactions tend 
to be very illiquid and are associated with relatively high search and transaction costs which make 
immediate arbitrage execution difficult. 
Nevertheless, if REIT managers follow this decision rule and attempt to exploit the inter-
market arbitrage opportunities, REITs should become active buyers or sellers in the property 
market depending on whether the share trades at a premium or discount to NAV. In addition, the 
overall magnitude of the PNAV should have a deterministic impact on managerial decisions to 
execute initial public offerings (IPO) or on M&A decision within the REIT sector. This dissertation 
investigates whether the frequency of transactions on either side is impacted by PNAV and 
whether PNAV has an impact on IPO and M&A decisions.  
When premium to NAV occurs for the REIT sector in aggregate, it is possible that 
numerous REIT managers are attempting to exploit inter-market arbitrage opportunities, and prices 
for individual assets may be bid upwards due to competition for acquisitions from other REITs. 
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Thus, REIT industry-wide premiums to NAV are expected to put upward pressure on property 
prices for assets targeted for investment by REIT managers. Existing studies note that REITs tend 
to pay significantly higher prices in property market acquisitions (Hardin and Wolverton 1999; 
Lambson, McQueen and Slade 2004; Ling and Petrova 2009; Akin et al. 2013). This dissertation 
examines whether REITs’ property acquisitions that are motivated by share premiums to NAV 
cause REITs to pay relatively higher prices for similar assets when compared to other investors.  
The investigation of purchase price paid by REIT requires careful sample selection process 
as a preliminary step. Akin et al. (2013) find that REITs typically purchase different types of 
properties (e.g. larger and newer properties) compared to non-REIT buyers (e.g. individuals, 
partnerships, limited liability companies, etc.). They also argue that REITs buy properties with 
higher-quality characteristics which are unobservable. To address potential sample selection bias 
according to the buyer clienteles, I limit buyer types only to institutional investors including Listed 
REIT, Non-listed REIT, Private REIT, Equity Fund, Insurance, Investment Manager and Pension 
Fund. In addition, due to heterogeneous nature of commercial properties, classical hedonic pricing 
model (Rosen 1974) does not guarantee “apples-to-apples” comparison. To achieve a more direct 
comparison set, I apply a property matching technique to address sample selection issue (e.g. 
Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010; Wiley 2012). Previous studies report that REITs pay significant 
premium in property purchases compared to other buyer types (Hardin and Wolverton 1999; 
Lambson, McQueen and Slade 2004; Ling and Petrova 2009; Akin et al. 2013). I investigate 
whether this premium paid by REITs persists after the matching process, and whether it is 
influenced by NAV premiums/discounts. 
Furthermore, if REIT stock investors are aware of management’s opportunity to exploit 
inter-market arbitrage opportunities, then investors may respond favorably to activities that are 
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consistent with the arbitrage strategy. Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010) show that REITs are more 
likely to issue equity when the premium to NAV is high. This may indirectly suggest that REITs 
are issuing this equity because they desire to use the proceeds to purchase properties (although not 
directly examined in their study). Thus, new equity issuance when shares trade at a premium to 
NAV may signal to the stock market that REIT management is maneuvering to exploit the current 
arbitrage opportunity. In the finance literature, seasoned equity offerings (SEO) are often 
responded to negatively by investors because they are believed to signal that the stock is 
overvalued (Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984). Yet, for REITs, the negative abnormal stock 
returns followed by SEO announcements are mitigated relative to non-REIT firms (Howe and 
Shilling 1988; Francis, Lys and Vincent 2004; Ong, Ooi and Kawaguichi 2011). Francis, Lys and 
Vincent (2004) argue that REIT share offerings may convey positive information about new 
investment opportunities because REITs are cash-constrained due to the dividend payout 
requirement and must tap the capital market for new investments. In this dissertation, the stock 
price reaction to SEO announcements is differentiated for REITs issuing equity when shares trade 
at a premium or discount to NAV, and the magnitude of the premium or discount to NAV is 
interacted with the stock price reaction. This distinction allows for an important insight into the 
observed diminished negative stock price reaction for REITs following SEOs: perhaps share prices 
are not severely penalized because REIT managers are more likely to issue SEOs opportunistically, 
when there are premiums to NAV. 
Figure 1 shows that the pricing differential is persistent for long periods of time before 
returning to the no-arbitrage condition. Several of the unique characteristics of commercial real 
estate market may contribute to this persistence. First, unlike stock markets, real estate dual asset 
market arbitrages are difficult to implement for individual investors because they are lack of ability 
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to long or short the bulky, indivisible assets. Only REIT managers are positioned to execute the 
inter-market arbitrage strategy. There are several factors that may hinder REIT managers from 
executing arbitrage strategy efficiently. Commercial real estate transactions involve significant 
frictions. Property search and deal closings require significant time and expense, including 
management search along with brokerage and third-party fees. Furthermore, NAV is an estimate 
or opinion of value, rather than a precise value. By the time REIT management has identified a 
property for acquisition (disposition), the premium (discount) to NAV may have shifted. These 
factors contribute to prolonged periods of the pricing differential across the dual asset markets. 
REITs represent a nontrivial component of investment-grade commercial property 
transactions. Among transactions by institutional investors in the major markets, around 17-51% 
were executed by listed REITs (shown in Table 1). Considering the scale of REIT activity in the 
property market, it is important to understand the extent to which REIT property investment 
strategies are affected by inter-market pricing differentials. REITs tend to generate returns 
primarily through income yields rather than capital gains. However, inter-market pricing 
differentials can make REITs change their colors from an income stock to a growth stock which 
may be perceived as a source of risk for REIT investors (Geltner et al. 2014). This paper offers 
insights into factors that influence the color-changing timing of REIT stocks. 
Table 1 ■ Commercial real estate transactions by investor types. 
 Retail Office Multifamily 
Investor Types 
Volume 
($ billion) 
Share 
(%) 
Volume 
($ billion) 
Share 
(%) 
Volume 
($ billion) 
Share 
(%) 
Equity Funds 1.17 4.15 16.78 8.19 9.51 9.92 
Insurance 0.43 1.51 12.02 5.86 2.38 2.49 
Investment Manager 6.93 24.59 94.05 45.87 52.48 54.77 
Listed REIT 14.35 50.87 44.10 21.51 16.26 16.97 
Non-listed REIT 2.59 9.18 11.73 5.72 7.90 8.24 
Pension Fund 1.05 3.73 13.32 6.50 5.55 5.79 
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Private REIT 1.68 5.96 13.03 6.35 1.74 1.81 
Total 28.20 100 205.03 100 95.81 100 
Notes: This table reports the commercial real estate transaction volume ($ billion) during 2001-
2014 by investor types. Listed REIT indicates publicly-traded REITs. Data is composed from 
CoStar. Data is limited to transactions with sale price of at least $50,000 and building size of at 
least 10,000 square feet (SF). Data includes only transactions that occurred in submarkets which 
have at least 100 transactions during the sample period. 
 
This dissertation investigates whether REIT managers exploit the arbitrage opportunities 
between the two parallel markets. Using SNL data for the entire asset holdings of each REIT in 
the sample, the frequency of net purchases versus net divestiture that occur in the property market 
is evaluated in light of PNAV. In addition, firm level decisions of IPO and M&A are related to 
PNAV. Using CoStar property market transactions data for individual assets, the property purchase 
premiums paid by REIT managers are compared to asset prices paid by other investors and this 
property purchase premium is related to PNAVs. In this analysis, the dataset is constructed using 
a property matching procedure to address potential sample selection bias. Finally, utilizing CRSP 
daily stock return and CRSP/Ziman REIT index return data, abnormal stock return around the 
equity issuance announcement date is analyzed in relation to PNAVs. The evidence provided in 
this dissertation offers valuable insights into the consequences of mispricings and arbitrage 
opportunities in the dual asset markets.  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Dissertation 
The broad objective of this dissertation is to extend the body of knowledge regarding the dual 
nature of real estate markets by investigating the behavior of REIT management when faced with 
premiums or discounts to NAV, and the response of shareholders. Toward this end, the dissertation 
addresses the following specific questions. 
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1. When shares trade at premiums (discounts) to NAV, do REIT managers become more 
active as buyers (sellers) in the property market? 
2.  Do private real estate funds have an increased propensity to go public when there is a 
market-wide REIT share premium? On the other hand, do public firms become M&A 
targets when their shares trade at discount? 
3. In property acquisitions, do REIT managers pay a higher (lower) price relative to other 
investors when the REIT shares experience market-wide premiums (discounts) to NAV? 
4.  Does the property purchase premium paid by REITs reported in the previous research 
persist after conditioning the dataset with the matching procedure methodology? 
5. When shares trade at a premium to NAV, are new equity issues by REITs met with smaller 
negative abnormal stock returns? 
 
1.3 Contribution of the Dissertation 
Existence of dual assets markets is somewhat unique to real estate, and the mispricing of claims 
on the underlying assets across the two markets appears quite common. An improved 
understanding of the consequences from related arbitrage opportunities should be useful to both 
property market and stock market participants who seek to make optimal investment decisions. 
This dissertation investigates the responsiveness of REIT managers in the property market and 
REIT equity investors in the stock market surrounding inter-market pricing differentials. Specific 
contributions are summarized for two specific areas below. 
First, this dissertation investigates property market transactions. The focus of previous 
research on the premium to NAV has been limited to issues in the stock market. One line of 
research aims to explain the drivers of premium to NAV in the stock market (Capozza and Lee 
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1995; Barkham and Ward 1999; Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer 2003; Brounen, Ling and Prado 
2013). Other research investigates how the premium to NAV affects security issuances by REITs 
(Boudry, Kallberg and Liu 2010). This dissertation directs the research attention to the property 
market. Specifically, the dissertation investigates whether REIT managers attempt to exploit the 
inter-market pricing differential in the property market. At the property level, REIT managers can 
change their investment strategy to become net buyers (sellers) when there are premiums 
(discounts) to NAV. At the entity level, private firms may go public when management expects 
premium valuations by the stock market, while public firms may become M&A targets when their 
shares trade at a discount. REIT managers may pay a higher price for individual assets during 
periods of premium to NAV to secure a deal from other competitors. By adopting a matching 
technique to the transactions data, this dissertation offers an enhanced understanding for the 
property purchase premium paid by REITs that has been reported in previous research. 
Second, this dissertation examines REIT shareholders’ reaction surrounding premiums to 
NAV. It ought to be favorable information that REIT management intends to exploit the temporal 
arbitrage opportunity. New equity issuances that occur when shares trade at a premium to NAV 
might signal that management aims to acquire new assets using proceeds from the equity issue. 
Consequently, investors may respond favorably to such value-enhancing actions, resulting in 
diminished negative abnormal returns for SEOs when REIT shares trade at a premium to NAV. 
 
1.4 Organization of the Dissertation 
The plan for this dissertation is as follows: Chapter two provides the conceptual background of the 
dissertation by reviewing the previous literature on REIT property transactions and REIT share 
prices. Next, the hypotheses are developed. Chapter three presents the data, methodology and the 
13 
 
model. Chapter four discusses the empirical results. Chapter five concludes the dissertation with 
final remarks and implications. 
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CHAPTER TWO ─ LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Inter-market Arbitrage 
The arbitrage opportunity between public and property markets is well described in Geltner et al. 
(2014). In the property market, properties are traded at market value ( pMV ). For each property, 
REIT investors have their own investment value ( RIV ). The inter-market arbitrage opportunity 
arises when the investment value for REIT investors diverges from the property market value, 
PR MVIV  . When the stock market values the portfolio of a REIT’s properties greater than the 
property market does, REIT managers face a positive net present value (NPV) arbitrage 
opportunity such that 0 PRR MVIVNPV . Under this scenario, REIT managers achieve the 
positive NPV by issuing new equity in the stock market and using the proceeds to acquire new 
assets in the property market. Alternatively, if the portfolio of REIT assets is undervalued by the 
stock market, 0 RPR IVMVNPV , REIT management can take advantage of these conditions 
by divesting of assets in the property market and using the proceeds to repurchase shares or pay 
special dividends. These activities have consequences for shifting share prices and asset values in 
the property market in a direction that should diminish the arbitrage opportunity over time. 
The literature review in this section provides the theoretical framework for the dissertation. 
The first section of the literature review begins with coverage of research that is related to the 
inter-market pricing differential. PNAV may have influences both in the property market and the 
public equity market. The second section focuses on the property market, reviewing investment 
activities and relative transaction prices of REIT managers. Shifting focus to the stock market, the 
third section provides a review of studies for REIT security issuance events. For methodological 
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development, the fourth section covers transaction matching techniques used in hedonic pricing 
applications. 
 
2.2 Inter-market Pricing Differential 
Deviations of share prices from NAV have been studied for REITs in the stock market context. 
One stream of research seeks to explain the underlying cause of such pricing deviations. Capozza 
and Lee (1995) investigate the sources and outcomes of PNAV. They document that retail REITs 
trade at significant premiums while warehouse/industrial REITs trade at discounts. Also, large 
REITs enjoy premiums while small REITs experience discounts. However, PNAV has no impact 
on funds from operations (FFO). REIT shares that trade at a discount to NAV, such as small-cap 
and warehouse/industrial REITs, tend to have higher than average expense ratio. Large REITs 
typically use higher than average financial leverage. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) analyze the 
underpricing in REIT IPOs in the 1990s. They report that IPO underpricing for REITs is related to 
underwriter reputation, participation by institutional investors, financial leverage and active 
management. Utilizing the special characteristics of REITs, Gentry, Kemsley and Mayer (2003) 
investigate the impact of shareholder-level tax benefits on share prices. The nature of REIT assets 
offers tax shields from depreciation and REITs are tax-exempt at the corporate level. They find 
that the tax advantages of REITs are capitalized into share prices. In a parallel market study using 
U.K. REITs, Barkham and Ward (1999) find that the market capitalization is commonly lower 
than NAV. They hypothesize that the discount to NAV results from agency costs, possible capital 
gain taxes and several firm-specific characteristics. They find that the capital gain tax and 
company-specific factors (e.g., size, trading stocks) have an impact on the individual stock 
discounts, but the broader sentiment for the sector is also an important factor. Brounen, Ling and 
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Prado (2013) study the impact of short-sale restrictions on REIT PNAV. They find that short-sale 
activity explains one-third of the PNAV variations. Contrary to Barkham and Ward (1999), the 
effect of short-sale constraints seems to overwhelm the investor sentiment effect. Short sale 
constraints lead to greater fluctuations in PNAV over the short-run and cause overvaluation when 
demand for short positions is strong but supply is limited. Utilizing short sales, dual asset market 
mispricings are only corrected when REIT share trade at a premium to NAV. 
The mean-reversion properties of the price/NAV ratio has also been investigated. In the 
U.K., Barkham and Ward (1999) investigate the long-term relationship between property company 
stock prices and NAV and find a stable equilibrium relationship. In another U.K. study, Patel, 
Pereira and Zavodov (2009) show that the discount to NAV has a mean-reverting tendency to the 
long-term mean of 20%. For Singapore property companies, Liow (2003) finds some evidence that 
the stock prices revert towards the company’s NAV and suggests that the stock prices and NAV 
are nonlinearly linked.  
The reaction of stock market investors to pricing differentials has received relatively less 
attention. Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010) investigate the determinants of REIT security issuance. 
They find that REITs are more likely to issue equity when price/NAV ratio is high. They suggest 
that REITs attempt to enjoy the valuation differential between public and property markets. In 
other words, REITs tend to issue equity when the cost of capital is relatively cheaper in the stock 
market. Yet, the actions that REIT managers take in response to PNAVs have not yet been 
investigated for transactions in the property market. 
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2.3 REIT Property Transactions 
The investment decision of REIT managers in the property market has been studied in the extant 
literature. Riddiough and Wu (2009) investigate investment and liquidity management of REITs 
which are cash-constrained due to the dividend payout requirements. They document that REITs 
increase investment when they have greater bank line of credit capacity and cash stock. Eichholtz 
and Yönder (2014) analyze the influence of CEO overconfidence on REIT investment activity. 
They find that REITs invest more when the CEO is overconfident. REITs that have an 
overconfident CEO buy more property and sell less frequently when compared to REITs that do 
not have an overconfident CEO. They also find that the REITs led by overconfident CEOs exhibit 
weak performance in net operating income and revenue growth. Both Riddiough and Wu (2009) 
and Eichholtz and Yönder (2014) control investment opportunity using Tobin’s q (Brainard and 
Tobin 1968; Tobin 1969) based on book values. Overall, REITs invest more when there is greater 
investment opportunity, as measured by Tobin’s q. Unlike other firms, REITs offer a more accurate 
measure for Tobin’s q since the assets are largely tangible and held in real estate. Thus, Tobin’s q 
for REITs can be more accurately measured using NAV rather than book values for assets (Hartzell, 
Sun and Titman 2006). 
REITs are constrained in their ability to sell property due to REIT regulation. Mühlhofer 
(2013) examines the impact of the dealer rule on REIT returns. The dealer rule refers the selling 
constraints imposed on REITs: REITs should hold each property at least four years and they are 
allowed to sell only 10% of their total portfolio in a given year. The minimum holding period 
requirement was reduced to two years on July 30, 2008. Mühlhofer shows that REIT returns do 
not reflect capital gains in the short-run due to the dealer rule constraint. However, umbrella 
partnership REITs (UPREITs) are relatively free from the dealer rule because the contributing 
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partner’s holding period counts toward REIT’s holding period. In a related study, Mühlhofer (2014) 
shows that the dealer rule is costly to investors. 
Extensive research has been conducted on the motivation for going public (e.g. Rock 1986; 
Welch 1989; Chemmanur and Fulghieri 1999) and going private (e.g. Jensen 1986; Wruck 1990; 
North 2001) in finance. For REITs, Hartzell, Kallberg and Liu (2005) investigate the initial public 
offering (IPO) decision and find that IPO activity increases with strong property market conditions 
and high REIT share prices. Ling and Petrova (2011) explore the rationale for REITs to go private 
by investigating the characteristics of REITs that are targeted for M&A. They find that small and 
less liquid REITs which have high dividend yields are more likely to become M&A targets 
whereas UPREITs are less likely targets. Brau et al. (2013) also investigate the decision to go 
private by REITs and find that recently favorable performance and higher quality governance 
mechanisms negatively impact the decision to go private. In addition, they investigate the impact 
of private vs. public markets performance, measured as the spread between index returns of private 
and public markets. They report a positive but statistically insignificant coefficient for the spread. 
In the property market, certain investor clienteles pay higher prices when acquiring real 
estate assets. Wiley (2012) estimates a 12% premium paid by corporate investors compared to 
non-institutional investors in the office market. Liu, Gallimore and Wiley (2015) report a 13.8% 
premium paid by nonlocal office investors. REITs, among the clienteles, are found to pay much 
higher estimated premiums for acquisitions. Hardin and Wolverton (1999) find that apartment 
REITs pay premiums of 27% above market value for apartment assets in Atlanta and Phoenix. 
They attribute this premium to agency costs. REIT management may be under pressure to expand 
or believe that they can achieve operational efficiencies through scale. In the Phoenix apartment 
market, Lambson, McQueen and Slade (2004) find similar results for REIT transaction premiums 
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to Hardin and Wolverton (1999). Ling and Petrova (2009) estimate premiums in the range of 14-
16% in office, industrial and retail transactions.  
Akin et al. (2013) estimate the premium paid by REITs to be 30% after controlling physical 
property characteristics. Yet, when they apply a repeat sales approach, the estimated premium 
reduces to 6.4%. They conclude that REITs buy properties with unobserved higher-quality 
characteristics. The residual premium of 6.4% is explained by two factors. First, REITs are willing 
to overpay due to their advantageous cost of capital relative to other investors. This explains why 
publicly-traded and large REITs tend to pay the higher premiums. Second, REITs are time-
constrained in acquisitions on occasion due to REIT regulation. At least 75% of a REIT’s assets 
are required to be invested in real estate, cash or government securities, and at least 75% of a 
REIT’s gross income should be generated from real estate, including rents, mortgage interest and 
capital gains from asset sales. Essentially, a REIT has one year to deploy new capital into real 
estate holdings or REIT status is in jeopardy. REIT mangers have additional incentives to quickly 
deploy capital due to contractual obligations, management fees and performance evaluation. 
Consequently, REITs that recently obtained new capital tend to pay higher premiums for 
acquisitions. 
Property transactions can impact a firm’s stock returns. Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans 
(1991) investigate firm restructurings that involve real estate holdings. Surrounding the property 
transaction announcement day, divesting firms experience abnormal returns; acquiring firms do 
not. The authors attribute the abnormal returns for the divesting firm to tax shelter benefits. If a 
firm divests of a fully-amortized asset and replaces it with a similar asset, the firm enjoys greater 
depreciation benefits. In more recent research, Booth, Glascock and Sarkar (1996) apply a 
GARCH model and confirm the findings of Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans (1991). Focusing 
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exclusively on REITs, McIntosh, Ott and Liang (1995) find no abnormal returns surrounding 
transaction announcements. Yet, they find positive and significant abnormal returns when the asset 
sale is followed by an increase in dividends. Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) investigate 
portfolio acquisitions by REITs. In contrast to previous research, they provide evidence of a 
positive and significant abnormal return surrounding the purchase announcement. They attribute 
this finding to the wealth benefit that arises from geographical focus and the positive market signal 
obtained from the use of project-specific private debt and equity. Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans 
(2003) analyze REIT property sell-offs. Total proceeds greater than $20 million is defined as a 
property sell-off. They estimate abnormal returns in the magnitude of 1-3% around the 
announcement day, which is consistent with abnormal returns for non-REIT firms that make real 
estate divestitures. Since REITs are exempt from income taxes, the tax shelter benefits that 
accumulate to non-REIT firms (discussed in Glascock, Davidson and Sirmans 1991) fail to explain 
the gains to shareholders. Campbell, Petrova and Sirmans (2003) argue that the positive return 
stems from efficiency gains in asset reallocations. Wiley (2013) studies REIT asset sales in the 
context of opportunistic versus liquidation. Opportunistic (liquidation) sales occur when the firm 
sells real estate above (below) the fundamental value. He finds positive abnormal returns following 
opportunistic assets sales but no abnormal returns following liquidations. 
The existing literature discusses the factors that impact REIT investment decisions 
including property transactions, IPO and M&A and the observed property purchase price premium 
paid by REITs in the property market. In addition, the stock market response surrounding the REIT 
investment activity announcements has been covered. However, the PNAV motive for REIT 
investment has not been previously been documented in the extant literature. 
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2.4 REIT Security Issuance 
REITs are required by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to pay out at least 90% of taxable income 
as dividends. In addition, the REIT industry is capital-intensive. These conditions cause REITs to 
frequently access the capital markets. Ott, Riddiough and Yi (2005) report that 84% of REITs 
investments were financed by equity and long-term debt while only 7% were financed by retained 
earnings. 
Capital structure issues have been examined in theoretical and empirical studies since the 
seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958). Trade-off theory claims that there is an optimal 
capital structure which exists at the point where the marginal benefits from additional debt, such 
as tax benefits and lower cost of capital, are exactly offset by the increased marginal costs of higher 
debt levels, including expected financial distress costs (Modigliani and Miller 1958, 1963). 
Pecking-order theory argues that there is no optimal capital structure due to the inherent preference 
of managers in selecting among alternative sources of funding. Myers and Majluf (1984) develop 
an equilibrium model of the issuance-investment decision. The model suggests that firms may be 
reluctant to issue new equity. Management may have a strong preference for financing new 
projects with internally-generated cash flows, then debt, and equity issuance would be the most 
expensive and least desirable. Finally, market timing explanations (e.g., Graham and Harvey 2001, 
Baker and Wurgler 2002) suggest that managers attempt to time the market based on their private 
beliefs about the true value of the firm. 
The stock market reaction to the SEOs has an impact on the capital structure decision. In 
the short-horizon, a number of studies document stock return underperformance surrounding SEO 
announcements. Asquith and Mullins (1986) investigate the impact of SEOs on stock prices. They 
find abnormal announcement day returns of -2.7% and -0.9% for industrial and public utilities 
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firms respectively. They conclude that equity issues are viewed as a negative signal by investors, 
consistent with the theoretical argument in Myers and Majluf (1984). Masulis and Korwar (1986) 
also provide evidence of negative stock price reactions to SEOs. They attribute the negative shock 
to the signaling effect suggested by Leland and Pyle (1977). The Leland and Pyle (1977) model 
suggests that it is costly for managers to hold a large portion of the firm’s stock for diversification 
reasons. Thus, managers will hold large portions of the firm’s stock only when they expect high 
future cash flows relative to the current firm value. Accordingly, a stock offering that dilutes 
management’s ownership claim can be viewed as a negative signal about the firm’s perceived 
value by insiders. Masulis and Korwar (1986) find that the information conveyed in offerings is 
greater for industrial companies than for public utilities. They attribute this to the high frequency 
of offerings conducted by public utilities. Kalay and Shimrat (1987) test three possible hypotheses 
regarding the negative stock market reaction to new equity issues. The price-pressure hypothesis 
states that the firm is facing downward demand for its stock, thus the new issuance (increase in 
quantity) will reduce the price of outstanding stocks. The wealth-redistribution hypothesis argues 
that new equity issues are used to reduce the leverage ratio, increasing the market value of debt. 
The debt claim increases in value at the expense of equity shareholders. Finally, the information-
release hypothesis is along the lines of Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Kalay and Shimrat (1987) find empirical evidence supporting the information-release hypothesis. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) investigate the long-term impact of equity offerings on stock 
price returns and find that the issuing firm significantly underperforms non-issuing firms – called 
the new issues puzzle. During the five years following new equity issuance, firms with SEOs 
realized an average annual return of 7% while non-issuing counterparts realized a 15% return. 
Controlling for both firm size and book-to-market ratio, issuing firms experience lower returns 
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than the non-issuers over the long horizon. Loughran and Ritter (1995) argue that firms 
strategically time the market by issuing new equity when shares are overvalued. Spiess and 
Affleck-Graves (1995) also provide evidence of long-run underperformance by equity issuers. 
Returns on investment for equity-issuing firms are only 85% of the analogous returns for non-
issuing firms. They suspect that mis-measurement of related risks is the cause of this 
underperformance and conclude that their finding is consistent with market timing theory. 
Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) question the existence of the new issues puzzle. They 
find that SEO firms with small size and low book-to-market ratio underperform non-issuers. 
However, SEO firm returns co-vary with non-issuing firm returns, and the return pattern of issuers 
is no different from non-issuers. SEO firms are part of systematic price movements in the market. 
Eckbo, Masulis and Norli (2000) adopt a matching technique, analogous to Fama and French 
(1993), to construct size and book-to-market ranked portfolios. They show that issuer 
underperformance is a reflection of lower systematic risk by issuing firms relative to that of 
matched non-issuers. They conclude that the new issues puzzle is the result of a failure to 
appropriately control for risk in the empirical testing. 
In the case of REITs, negative share price performance following SEOs are somewhat 
mitigated compared to non-REIT firms. Howe and Shilling (1988), investigating REITs equity 
offerings, find -1.9% average two-day excess return in response to the announcement compared to 
non-REIT firms’ -3.1% average return. Francis, Lys and Vincent (2004) also find negative stock 
market reaction to the SEO announcements but with smaller magnitude relative to non-REIT firms, 
consistent with Howe and Shilling (1998). They attribute their finding to the cash-constrained 
nature of REIT. REITs are required to payout up to 90% of taxable income as dividends which 
limits the internal financing ability. Thus, REITs have to access the capital market for new 
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investments and the equity offering does not necessarily convey a negative signal. For Singapore 
and Japan REITs, Ong, Ooi and Kawaguichi (2011) find that the simultaneous announcement of 
property acquisition mitigates the negative share price performance following SEO 
announcements. They argue that the contemporaneous property acquisition announcement 
increases the transparency associated with the use of new equity proceeds. 
The SEO offering price has also been investigated. Parsons and Raviv (1985) model the 
offering price of SEOs, with the prediction that the offering price will be lower than the pre-offer 
price. On the other hand, Loderer, Sheehan and Kadlec (1991) fail to find convincing evidence 
that offering prices are systematically lower than market prices. In the REIT context, Ghosh, Nag 
and Sirmans (2000) test competing theories of the SEO offering price. They find that REITs offer 
new equity issues at a lower price than both the closing price the day before and the closing price 
on the day of the offer, consistent with Parsons and Raviv (1985). 
For REIT capital structure overall, Brown and Riddiough (2003) analyze REIT financing 
choice and debt structure. They find that REITs are mostly likely to use proceeds from new equity 
issues for investment, while proceeds from public debt offerings tend to be used for restructuring 
of liabilities. Firms with high level of secured debt are more likely to issue equity than public debt. 
Public debt issuers pursue long-run target leverage ratios in order to maintain investment-grade 
ratings. Boudry, Kallberg and Liu (2010) investigate the marginal capital structure choice of REITs. 
They find strong support for market timing theory. REITs are more likely to issue equity when the 
premium to NAV is high. 
Overall, previous studies suggest that SEO announcements convey negative signals to the 
market. However, for REITs, the negative impact can be reduced if the SEO announcement 
simultaneously carries information about new investment opportunities. Since PNAV can be 
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exploited by REIT managers to achieve positive investment, PNAV may indirectly convey positive 
signals to the stock market at the time an SEO is announced. 
 
2.5 Matching in Hedonic Pricing Models 
Hedonic pricing theory (Rosen 1974) states that the goods are valued for their utility-producing 
characteristics. Adapting Rosen (1974), hedonic pricing models are widely used in residential and 
commercial real estate research. However, commercial properties are more heterogeneous than 
residential and simple application of hedonic model to commercial real estate does not guarantee 
an “apples-to-apples” comparison. To overcome this issue, a propensity score matching technique 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, 1984) has been adapted to real estate hedonic pricing models. To 
estimate the treatment effect, the matching technique pairs each observation in the treatment group 
with a counterpart observation that has similar characteristics based on nearest-neighbor 
propensity score matching with replacement. In commercial real estate, the propensity score 
matching procedure has been applied by Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (2010), Wiley (2014), Wiley 
et al. (2014) and Liu, Gallimore and Wiley (2015). In residential research, McMillen (2012) 
suggests the matching estimator price index as an alternative to hedonic or repeat sales based 
indices. The hedonic model is known to suffer from possible omitted variable bias. The repeat 
sales approach overcomes the omitted variable problem but significantly reduces sample size and 
requires the assumption that property characteristics do not change over the sample period. 
McMillen argues that the matching approach allows for a larger sample size than the repeat sales 
approach while still reducing issues from omitted variable bias. Thus, the matching estimator index 
represents the middle ground between a classical hedonic index and the repeat sales index. The 
matching approach is implemented with similar but not identical homes. Repeat sales index is the 
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extreme case of a matching process. McMillen demonstrates that the matching approach produces 
an equivalent estimator to the repeat sales estimator. 
Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley (2010) match each subject property to nearby properties in the 
same submarket. Wiley (2012) applies a similar matching process to that of Eichholtz, Kok and 
Quigley (2010). Wiley clusters subject properties by submarket, property class, property age, 
property size and transaction date. To be included in the matched control group, properties must 
be in the same submarket and of the same property class. Also, the properties should have age 
within five years of subject property and property size within 40% of subject property. Finally, 
transactions must have occurred within two years of the transaction date of subject property. In 
later research, Wiley (2013) applies ranges of 15 years property age, 50% of property size and 
one-year transaction period. 
Akin et al. (2013) argue that REITs, compared to non-REIT investors, are typically 
interested in a specific subset of properties such as larger properties. Also, as will be covered in 
the data section, institutional investors (e.g., REITs, investment managers, equity funds) transact 
significantly larger assets compared to non-institutional investors (e.g., individuals, corporations, 
owner-occupiers). Simple application of the hedonic model using raw data will result in biased 
estimations. Thus, it is necessary to carefully construct the dataset using the matching procedure 
as a preliminary step for the empirical analyses. 
 
2.6 Hypotheses Development 
The dual asset market is unique to real estate and a REIT’s PNAV can be evaluated by analysts. 
Consequently, REIT managers are often faced with inter-market arbitrage opportunities. The 
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literature review reveals that research on PNAV has primarily focused on explaining causes of the 
PNAV, while it has not been fully investigated whether REITs attempt to exploit the inter-market 
arbitrage opportunities in the property market or how REIT shareholders react to new equity issues 
that occur under premiums to NAV in the stock market. This dissertation investigates PNAVs in 
four dimensions: (i) whether PNAV causes REITs to become more active buyers (sellers) in the 
property market, (ii) whether PNAV affects the firm level IPO or M&A decisions, (iii) whether 
premium to NAV causes REIT managers to pay a higher price in property acquisitions, and (iv) 
whether REIT shares experience less severe negative abnormal returns when new equity is issued 
during periods of premiums to NAV. 
Hypothesis 1: If REIT managers attempt to exploit the inter-market arbitrage opportunity, REITs 
will become net buyers (sellers) in the property market when shares trade at a premium (discount) 
to NAV. 
When the stock market values a REIT’s underlying assets greater than the property market 
does (premium to NAV), REIT managers are faced with positive arbitrage opportunities which 
can be exploited by issuing new equity in the stock market and purchasing new assets in the 
property market. When shares trade at a premium to NAV, REIT managers are expected to become 
more active buyers in the property market. On the other hand, when shares trade at a discount to 
NAV, REIT managers can exploit the arbitrage opportunity by selling assets in the property market 
and distributing the proceeds to shareholders – either through share repurchases or special 
dividends. Thus, REIT managers are expected to become active sellers in the property market 
when shares trade at a discount to NAV. 
Hypothesis 2-1: If management of a privately-held real estate fund expect share price premiums 
in the public market, it may positively influence their decision to go public. 
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Hypothesis 2-2: If a publicly-listed REIT’s share trade at discount to NAV, management may be 
inclined to allow a merger and acquisition to occur. 
To accomplish positive arbitrage, managers may act at the firm level instead of trading 
individual properties. For instance, if management of a privately-held real estate fund expects their 
shares to trade at premium to NAV in the public market, they may decide to go public – effectively 
selling the entire portfolio of underlying assets to the public market at a higher price. Conversely, 
if a publicly-listed REIT has shares trading at discount to NAV, management may allow M&A 
which would effectively result in selling of the full portfolio at the valuation assigned by the 
property market. 
Hypothesis 3: If REIT managers attempt to exploit the inter-market arbitrage opportunities, REITs 
are more likely to pay a higher premium for property acquisitions that occur when there is a 
market-wide share price premium to NAV. 
Akin et al. (2013) hypothesize that REITs are willing to pay a premium in the property 
market because they enjoy a lower cost of capital. They use large vs. small and public vs. private 
REITs as proxies for advantages in cost of capital. They find that large REITs and public REITs 
tend to pay more compared to small REITs and private REITs respectively. 
Regardless of cost of capital, REITs may not want to systematically pay higher than market 
values due to inefficiencies. However, when the premium to NAV is not specific to a REIT but a 
market-wide phenomenon, competition from other REIT managers chasing the same deals will bid 
up property prices. Once the capital market is tapped and new equity has already been issued, the 
clock is ticking on capital deployment. Under these conditions, REIT managers may bid 
aggressively with one another in competition for the acquisition. Thus, competition from other 
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bidders may cause REIT managers to pay relatively higher prices in the property market when 
REIT industry is experiencing market-wide share price premiums to NAV. 
On the other hand, property divestitures by REIT managers may not be as competitive as 
acquisitions. While continuing to hold assets under management, REIT managers enjoy 
management fees (Graff 2001) creating incentives to preserve the portfolio size and a reluctance 
to liquidate. In addition, as Mühlhofer (2013, 2014) points out, the dealer rule restricts REIT 
management in their ability to sell for capital gains and effectively places minimum holding 
periods for REIT assets. Accordingly, the property sale price by REITs is not expected to be 
affected in a direct manner by the premium to NAV. 
Hypothesis 4: If a matched sample methodology is applied, then the estimated acquisition 
premium in the property market paid by REITs (relative to other investors) will be lower than that 
documented in previous research. 
REITs are found to pay around 14-27% premiums in property acquisitions compared to 
other buyer types (Hardin and Wolverton 1999; Lambson, McQueen and Slade 2004; Ling and 
Petrova 2009). Compared to other clienteles, the premium paid by REITs is substantial. For 
example, Wiley (2012) reports an estimated 12% premium paid by corporate investors and Liu, 
Gallimore and Wiley (2015) report an estimated 14% premium paid by nonlocal investors. 
The premiums reported in the previous research may be caused by sample selection issues. 
Akin et al. (2013) find that REITs typically purchase different types of properties compared to 
non-REIT buyers and argue that REITs do not necessarily pay a significant premium but instead 
purchase properties with unobserved higher-quality characteristics. To address sample selection 
issues, Akin et al. (2013) limits the data to properties with greater than 20,000 square feet and 
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apply a repeat sales methodology. However, they still find 6.4% premium paid by REITs. Some 
studies apply matching process to overcome the sample selection issue (e.g. Eichholtz, Kok and 
Quigley 2010; Wiley 2012). McMillen (2012) demonstrates that the matching estimator produces 
equivalent results to repeat sales estimator in housing research. 
REIT managers are sophisticated investors and may not want to pay more than the market 
value. Sample selection bias may drive the premium paid by REITs in the previous research. Thus, 
when each property acquired by a REIT is paired with a transaction of a similar asset purchased 
by non-REIT institutional investors, the estimated premium paid by REITs should be lower than 
estimated premiums when matching techniques are not applied.  
Hypothesis 5: If REIT stock investors are aware that managerial actions are aligned with inter-
market arbitrage opportunities, an observed premium to NAV will mitigate the negative stock price 
shock followed by new equity issuance announcement.  
In general finance, SEOs are met with negative stock price reactions in the short-run 
(Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986; Kalay and Shimrat 1987). However, the 
negative stock price reaction is mitigated in REIT SEOs due to the investment opportunities linked 
to new equity issues which may carry positive signal (Francis, Lys and Vincent 2004; Ong, Ooi 
and Kawaguichi 2011). 
A firm’s property acquisition is not typically bad news for investors. In both REIT and 
non-REIT firms, most studies find that there is no abnormal return for property acquirers (Glascock, 
Davidson and Sirmans 1991; Booth, Glascock and Sarkar 1996; McIntosh, Ott and Liang 1995). 
Property acquisition can even be good news for investors. Petrova and Sirmans (2003) investigate 
REIT portfolio purchases and find positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcement date. 
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REIT equity issuance may differ from non-REIT firms, specifically if such actions occur 
when shares trade at a premium to NAV. In such a case, REIT managers have the opportunity to 
achieve positive arbitrage by acquiring assets in the property market. If REIT management 
attempts to capitalize on the window of opportunity, this should be good news for investors. New 
equity issues when there is a premium to NAV may signal actions taken by REIT managers that 
are consistent with the arbitrage strategy. As Brown and Riddiough (2003) show, REITs are most 
likely to use equity issue proceeds for new investment. Thus, if shares trade at a premium to NAV 
and investors are aware of the arbitrage opportunity, an equity issuance announcement should be 
met with diminished negative abnormal returns compared to those observed for firms announcing 
equity issuance during periods when their shares are trading at a discount to NAV. 
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CHAPTER THREE ─ DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Data 
This dissertation investigates the PNAV effect on property market and stock market outcomes. 
From the SNL database, a total of 284 REITs are identified (175 active REITs and 109 historical). 
For each REIT, I collect PNAVs and investment activity over the period spanning from 2001 to 
2014 using SNL data. The monthly PNAV is calculated using monthly share prices and NAV data. 
The PNAV is then annualized by taking the average for the year. There are 161 REITs that have 
at least one available PNAV observed during the sample period. In total, 1,190 firm-year 
observations are available. The SNL data for PNAV is summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 ■ Summary of firm level PNAV data. 
 N Mean Std. Min. Max 
PNAV (%)  1,190  0.23 14.97 -52.17 65.45 
Premium to NAV (%)  595  11.39 10.11 0.04 65.45 
Discount to NAV (%)  595  -10.92 9.86 -52.17 -0.09 
Notes: This table summarizes the firm level annual average PNAV (%) from SNL. Data runs from 
January 2001 to December 2014. 
 
Real estate investment activity data for each firm-year is collected, including real estate 
investment growth and real estate property purchases and sales (both in count and value). 
Investment activities are excluded from the analysis if the REIT is no longer actively traded and 
the property transactions occur within two years of the exchange delisting event. It is worth noting 
that value-based acquisition data from SNL may underestimate the actual value of REIT 
acquisition activities because SNL data does not include land or development acquisitions in their 
reporting. In addition, there are several records with missing transactions prices. 
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REIT investment activity and PNAVs are compared in Figure 2. Overall, REITs actively 
purchase properties subsequent to NAV premiums and become less active in property acquisitions 
during times when shares trade at a discount to NAV. The lag between observed PNAVs and 
property market investment activity corresponds with the processing time required for equity 
issuance, property search and deal closing. In Figure 2, Panels B and C, disposition activity appears 
to have a negative relation to PNAVs over the sample period. 
Figure 2 ■ REIT real estate investment activities and PNAV. 
Panel A: Real estate investment growth  
 
 
 
Panel B: Count based activity 
 
Panel C: Value based activity 
  
Notes: This figure displays market-wide premium/discount to NAV (PNAV) and REIT investment 
activities in the property market over the period 2001-2014. PNAV is the market capitalization 
weighted average which is collected from SNL. Panel A displays market capitalization weighted 
average of real estate investment growth (%) of all REITs which is collected from SNL. In Panel 
B, acquisition (disposition) activity is total count of purchases (sales) of all REITs. In Panel C, 
acquisition (disposition) activity is sum of purchase (sale) prices of all REITs in $ billion. 
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REIT IPO announcements are also collected from SNL during the 2001-2014 period. Panel 
A of Figure 3 shows the annual PNAV average along with the count of IPOs for the REIT sector. 
The annual PNAV average does not include newly listed (IPO) firms. IPO announcements appear 
to increase when the REIT industry encounters a period of market-wide premiums to NAV. Data 
for M&A announcements is collected from SNL and Securities Data Company (SDC) during the 
period spanning from 2001 to 2014. Panel B in Figure 3 provides the tally of M&A announcements 
over the sample period. Market-wide PNAV and M&A announcements display a negative relation. 
Figure 3 ■ REIT IPO, M&A and PNAV. 
Panel A: REIT IPO count 
 
Panel B: REIT M&A count 
 
Notes: This figure displays REIT initial public offerings (IPO) and merger and acquisitions (M&A) 
over the period of 2001-2014. IPO data is collected from SNL. M&A data is collected from SNL 
and SDC. Premium/discount to NAV (PNAV) represents the market capitalization weighted 
average of REITs’ annual PNAVs (%) collected from SNL. In panel A, the annual PNAV average 
does not include newly listed (IPO) firms. 
 
 Two sources of data are used for REIT property purchase price analyses. The market-wide 
PNAV data is collected from the Green Street Advisors, LLC. Green Street provides the monthly 
average PNAV since February 1990. As of 2013, the reporting encompasses 87 REITs across 
North America. The company’s coverage is summarized in Table 3. Since the coverage is heavily 
biased towards, retail, office and multifamily property sector, the analysis is limited to three types 
of properties: retail, office and multifamily. 
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Table 3 ■ Green Street Advisors REIT coverage by sector. 
 Sector Number of REITs Asset ($ trillion) 
 Office                18  21%  12.1 21% 
 Retail                21  24%  14.6 25% 
 Multifamily                10  11%  7.7 13% 
 Industrial                  4  5%  3.2 5% 
 Health Care                  7  8%  7.3 13% 
 Hotel                  8  9%  3.3 6% 
 Lab Space                  2  2%  1.4 2% 
 Manufactured Home Park                  2  2%  0.5 <1% 
 Net Lease                  4  5%  2.3 4% 
 Self-Storage                  4  5%  1.8 3% 
 Student Housing                  3  3%  0.8 1% 
 Tech                  4  5%  3.4 6% 
 Total                87    58.4  
Notes: This table reports the REITs covered in Green Street Advisors premium to NAV estimation. 
The sector indicates the property type that REIT is specialized in. Asset is sum of asset value 
($ trillion) of REITs by sector as of 2013. 
 
Market-wide average annual PNAV summary is provided in Table 4.  
Table 4 ■ Summary of market-wide PNAV. 
 N Mean Std. Min. Max 
PNAV (%) 14 4.26 9.44 -13.53 20.96 
Premium to NAV (%) 10 8.93 5.83 0.87 20.96 
Discount to NAV (%) 4 -7.42 5.44 -13..53 -1.86 
Notes: This table summarizes the market-wide annual PNAV (%) from Green Street Advisors. 
Data runs from 2000 to 2013. 
 
Figure 4 compares PNAV from Green Street Advisors and SNL. SNL PNAV is market 
capitalization weighted average. The two series move together closely with correlation of 0.89.  
Figure 4 ■ Market-wide PNAV comparison. 
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Notes: This figure compares annual average PNAV for all REITs. The solid line represents data 
from Green Street Advisors. The dashed line indicates market capitalization weighted average 
PNAV constructed from SNL. 
 
Data for property market transaction is collected from CoStar property database. Property 
types include office, retail and multifamily buildings. In the database, buyer types are identified 
including individual, corporate/user, equity fund, insurance, investment manager, pension fund, 
private REIT and REIT. However, public REITs are not differentiated in the dataset for non-listed 
versus listed REITs. Thus, I match the REIT company name with SNL database to identify the 
firms that are exchange-listed REITs. Properties transaction dates range from January 2001 
through December 2014. The dataset is restricted to include only transactions with a sale price of 
at least $50,000 and building size of at least 10,000 square feet (SF). The dataset is further refined 
to include only transactions that occur in submarkets which have at least 100 transactions during 
the period in order to avoid bias from thinly-traded submarkets. 
Property transaction summaries are provided in Table 5 according to property type and 
investor type. Across all property types, individuals, corporates and users typically purchase 
smaller size assets when compared to other institutional investor types.  
37 
 
Table 5 ■ Property purchase summary by buyer types. 
 Retail Office Multifamily 
 N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) 
Individual 5,709 2,984 24,780 6,199 3,112 37,919 9,498 3,354 38,315 
Corporate & User 2,539 4,299 39,421 2,746 6,779 61,166 762 5,528 59,763 
Equity Fund 79 14,813 73,507 309 54,319 202,051 409 23,249 208,564 
Pension Fund 38 27,704 86,602 132 100,919 290,469 79 70,267 251,925 
Insurance 47 9,070 64,245 180 66,775 222,166 49 48,639 221,628 
Investment Manager 488 14,209 69,803 1,755 53,592 211,670 1,735 30,248 220,057 
Non-listed REIT 220 11,768 73,423 256 45,827 198,621 175 45,130 256,939 
Private REIT 180 9,338 60,425 324 40,202 179,696 131 13,261 170,517 
Listed REIT 775 18,510 87,319 641 68,796 228,219 331 49,113 276,972 
Total 10,075   12,542   13,169   
Notes: This table reports the mean values for property purchases by buyer type. All transactions occur during the January 2001-December 
2014 period. The transactions data is collected from CoStar. Listed REIT indicates publicly-traded REITs. The dataset is limited to 
include only transactions with sale prices of at least $50,000 and building size of at least 10,000 SF. Transactions from submarkets 
which have less than 100 transactions during the sample period are excluded.  
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For the analysis of stock market outcomes, data on REIT capital offerings is collected from 
SNL during the period January 2001 to December 2014. There are total 1,567 common equity 
offerings by 208 REITs. Figure 5 displays the number of common equity issuance announcements 
in the sector, along with the market-wide PNAV. Apart from the financial crisis during 2008-2009, 
the figure reveals a positive relation between PNAV and the frequency of common equity issuance. 
During the economic downturn, REITs may have issued common equity for reasons other than 
investment purposes, such as capital restructuring. 
Figure 5 ■ Common equity issuance announcements and PNAV. 
 
 
Notes: This figure displays REIT common equity issuance announcement count of all REITs over 
the period of 2001-2014, monthly. The data is collected from SNL. Multiple announcements in a 
same day by same REIT are counted as a single announcement. PNAV is market-wide monthly 
average collected from Green Street Advisors. 
 
Finally, REIT firm level data is collected from Compustat and CRSP on a quarterly and 
annual basis including cash stock, total assets, long-term debt, market capitalization and firm age 
(summarized later).  
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3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Property Investment Activity (Hypothesis 1) 
For REIT i , PNAV at time t  is defined as 
(1) 1/ ,,,  tititi NAVpriceNAV

 
where tiprice ,  is share price and tiNAV ,  is NAV per share. Eichholtz and Yönder (2014) 
investigate the connection between CEO overconfidence and REIT investment activity. In their 
analysis, the property acquisition and disposition activities are measured as 
(2)  
2/)( ,1,
,
,
titi
ti
ti
PFOPFO
purchases
acq



 and   
(3) 
2/)( ,1,
,
,
titi
ti
ti
PFOPFO
sales
dis



 
where tipurchases ,  and tisales ,  are total number (value) of properties purchased and sold during 
the period t  for REIT i  and tiPFO ,  is the total number (value) of properties included in the REIT 
portfolio. Finally, the investment activity, tiinv , , is modeled as 
(4) titi Xinv ,,    
with independent variables X . For the dependent variable, they use tiacq , , tidis ,  and 
tigrowthre ,_  
(real estate investment growth as reported in SNL). In this dissertation, net 
acquisition, defined as 
(5) tititi disacqacqnet ,,,_  , 
also enters the model as one of the dependent variables. Investment activity is modeled as 
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(6) tititi NAVXinv ,1,, 
   , and 
(7) titititi NAVNAVXinv ,1,21,1, 
  

 . 
The absolute magnitude of the premium and discount to NAV are defined as 
(8) ),0max( ,,

titi NAVNAV 

, and 
(9) )),0(min( ,,

titi NAVabsNAV 

, 
respectively. Control variables, X , include Firm Age in years and lagged values of Cash Ratio 
(cash-to-total assets ratio), Firm Size (log of total assets) and Debt Ratio (total liabilities-to-total 
assets ratio). Riddiough and Wu (2009) and Eichholtz and Yönder (2014) find that higher cash 
holdings have a positive and significant impact on REIT investment activity. Eichholtz and Yönder 
(2014) document that firm age is negatively related to investment activity, while firm size and the 
debt ratio do not have an impact on investment.   
Due to the reporting frequency of firm-level investment activities (e.g., real estate 
investment growth, property acquisitions and dispositions), the analysis is conducted at an annual 
frequency. In addition, the amount of time required to complete a commercial property acquisition 
or disposition is typically at least one year, including search, bargaining, financing and closing. As 
a result, it is expected that property transactions which respond to PNAVs should occur with a lag, 
following the observed pricing differential. Figure 2 shows REIT investment activity along with 
average PNAVs. Visually, the two series appear to support the notion of approximately one-year 
lag to investment in response to PNAVs. 
REITs are expected to be increasingly active buyers when they experience premium to 
NAV. The coefficients for 

tiNAV ,  in model (6) and 

tiNAV ,  in model (7) are expected to have a 
positive impact on acquisitions. Conversely, REITs are expected to become active sellers when 
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there is a discount to NAV. Thus, the estimated coefficient for 

tiNAV ,  in model (7) will have a 
positive impact on disposition. Table 6 summarizes the expected signs of premium/discount to 
NAV coefficients according to the various investment activity measures. 
Table 6 ■ Expected sign on premium/discount to NAV coefficients. 
Investment Variable 
Premium/discount to NAV variable 

tiNAV ,  

tiNAV ,  

tiNAV ,  
tiacq ,  positive positive negative 
tidis ,  negative negative positive 
tiacqnet ,_  positive positive negative 
tigrowthre ,_  positive positive negative 
Notes: This table summarizes the expected impact of premium/discount to NAV on REIT 
investment activity. 

tiNAV ,  is premium/discount to net asset value of REIT i  at time t  
( 1/ ,, titi NAVprice ). ),0max( ,,

titi NAVNAV 

 and )),0(min( ,,

titi NAVabsNAV 

. Real Estate 
Investment Growth ( tigrowthre ,_ ), Acquisition ( tiacq , ), Disposition ( tidis , ) and Net Acquisition 
( tiacqnet ,_ ) are defined as: 
tigrowthre ,_ = growth rate in real estate investment reported in SNL, 
]2/)/[( ,1,,, titititi PFOPFOpurchasesacq   , ]2/)/[( ,1,,, titititi PFOPFOsalesdis    and 
tititi disacqacqnet ,,,_  , where tipurchases ,  and tisales ,  are defined as total count (value) of 
properties purchased and sold during year t  for REIT i , and tiPFO ,  is the total count (value) of 
properties under REIT portfolio. 
 
Summary statistics for REIT investment activity are provided in Table 7. Firm 
characteristics are almost similar between firms experiencing premium and discount. 
Table 7 ■ Summary statistics for REIT investment activity. 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Dependent variable (Investment Activity) 
Real Estate Investment Growth (%)     
    (Number of distinct REITs: 136) 
1,016 12.03 24.27 -30.56 201.51 
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Transaction count based (%)     
    (Number of distinct REITs: 132) 
    Acquisition 988 8.50 12.93 0.00 111.11 
    Disposition 988 5.77 8.44 0.00 94.12 
    Net Acquisition 988 2.73 14.90 -91.18 111.11 
 
Transaction value based (%) 
    
    (Number of distinct REITs: 111) 
    Acquisition 857 11.40 18.63 0.00 207.48 
    Disposition 857 4.34 7.51 0.00 115.57 
    Net Acquisition 857 7.06 17.85 -54.15 197.82 
 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables 
 Premium  Discount Difference 
 Mean Min Max  Mean Min Max   
N 523    493     
PNAV (%) 11.47 0.04 65.44  -11.52 -52.17 -0.09 22.98 *** 
Firm Size 4,366 216 32,586  4,364 123 33,324 1.40  
Cash Ratio 0.024 0.00 0.34  0.026 0.00 0.30 -0.003  
Debt Ratio 0.466 0.00 0.99  0.492 0.04 1.04 -0.026 *** 
Firm Age 16.40 2 50  16.91 2 52 -0.51  
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for REIT investment activities on an annual basis. 
Data runs from 2001 to 2014. Investment activities data (Panel A) is collected from SNL. 
Real Estate Investment Growth = growth rate in real estate investment reported in SNL, 
Acquisition ]2/)/[( ,1,, tititi PFOPFOpurchases   , Disposition ]2/)/[( ,1,, tititi PFOPFOsales    
and Net Acquisition titi disacq ,,  , where tipurchases ,  and tisales ,  are defined as total count 
(value) of properties purchased and sold during year t  for REIT i  and tiPFO ,  is the total count 
(value) of properties under REIT portfolio. In Panel B, Premium/discount to NAV (PNAV) data 
is collected from SNL. Premium and discount indicate PNAV is positive and negative respectively. 
Firm fundamentals data is collected from Compustat and CRSP. Firm Size is total assets ($ million), 
Cash Ratio is cash to total assets ratio, Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio and Firm Age is age 
of the firm in years. 
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3.2.2 Going Public (Hypothesis 2-1) 
Since share prices are not observable for the private companies, I am unable to evaluate PNAVs 
at the individual firm level. Consequently, the going public and PNAV relationship is investigated 
at the market-level by examining the total number of IPOs and market wide PNAV. A greater 
number of IPO announcements are expected when the REIT sector as a whole is experiencing 
premiums to NAV. 
 
3.2.3 Becoming M&A Target (Hypothesis 2-2) 
The probability of becoming an M&A target is modeled as follows: 
(10) 
titititi
titiiti
CoverageInterestRatioCashRatioEBIT
RatioDebtSizeFirmNAVM
,1,61,51,4
1,31,21, )1Pr(

 




 
using a logit model. The indicator variable tiM ,  takes one if the firm i  becomes M&A target at 
year t  and zero otherwise. 

iNAV is three-month average premium/discount to NAV prior to 
M&A announcement. The size of discount ( iNAV ), which is )),0(min(

iNAVabs , is tested in 
place of  iNAV  as well. Firms with discounted share price are more likely to become an attractive 
M&A target and the coefficient for iNAV  is expected to be negative while the coefficient on 

iNAV  is expected to be positive. 
Other lagged explanatory variables include Firm Size (log of total assets), Debt Ratio (debt-
to-total assets ratio), EBIT Ratio (EBIT-to-total assets ratio), Cash Ratio (cash-to-total assets ratio) 
and Interest Coverage (EBIT-to-interest expenses ratio). Ling and Petrova (2011) find negative 
impacts of Firm Size and liquidity (Cash Ratio), but no significant impacts for profitability (EBIT 
Ratio) or leverage (Debt Ratio). 
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The dataset is constructed by combining M&A announcement firm-year data (as the 
treatment group) with non-announcing firm-year data (control group). Observations that occur two 
years before and after an M&A announcement are removed from the control group. To mitigate 
possible sample selection bias, each subject REIT is matched with control REITs which are within 
the ±20% range of total assets in the year preceding the announcement. After matching, there are 
55 clusters, each composed of one treatment REIT and one or more matching control REITs. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 8. M&A target firms have significant discounts to NAV 
when compared to non-announcing firms. 
Table 8 ■ Summary statistics for REIT M&A. 
Panel A: Summary statistics. 
 M&A Non-M&A Diff. t-val. 
 Mean Min Max Mean Min Max    
N 55   372      
PNAV (
NAV ) -7.98 -46.33 59.58 -1.30 -67.15 83.99 -6.68 
*** 
-2.68 
Discount (
NAV ) 11.19 0.00 46.33 6.32 0.00 53.20 4.87 
*** 
2.90 
Firm Size 3,608 389 22,084 2,669 321 17,954 939 * 1.67 
Debt Ratio 0.60 0.07 1.11 0.57 0.06 1.18 0.03  1.33 
Cash Ratio 0.02 0.00 0.16 0.03 0.00 0.43 0.00  -0.50 
EBIT Ratio 0.04 -0.07 0.10 0.05 -0.05 0.14 -0.01  -1.35 
Interest Coverage 2.17 -1.83 21.06 2.24 -12.86 95.51 -0.06  -0.11 
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix. 
 
M&A 
NAV  NAV  
Firm 
Size 
Debt 
Ratio 
Cash 
Ratio EBIT Ratio 
NAV  -0.13       
NAV  0.16 -0.73      
Firm Size 0.12 -0.04 0.01     
Debt Ratio 0.06 -0.27 0.23 0.05    
Cash Ratio -0.02 -0.09 0.05 -0.01 -0.01   
EBIT Ratio -0.07 0.20 -0.15 0.03 -0.08 -0.08  
Interest Coverage 0.00 0.17 -0.09 0.07 -0.35 0.01 0.30 
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Notes: This table reports the summary statistics for REIT merger and acquisition (M&A) activities 
on an annual basis. Data runs from 2001 to 2014. 
NAV  is three-month average premium/discount 
to NAV prior to M&A announcement. NAV  is size of discount which is )),0(min( iNAVabs . 
M&A indicates the firm being a target of M&A. Firm Size is total assets ($ million), Debt Ratio is 
debt to total assets ratio, Interest Coverage is EBIT to interest expenses ratio, EBIT Ratio is EBIT 
to total assets ratio and Cash Ratio is cash to total assets ratio. A subject REIT is matched with 
control REITs which are within the ±20% range of total assets of the subject on the prior year of 
the announcement. 
  
3.2.4 Property Purchase Price Premium (Hypothesis 3 & 4) 
A hedonic pricing model is applied to identify REIT premiums paid in property acquisitions. 
However, there are potential selection bias issues if REITs tend to buy properties with distinct 
physical and market characteristics. Akin et al. (2013) argue that REITs acquire properties with 
unobserved higher-quality characteristics. To address this issue, comparison group is restricted to 
include only institutional investors (Listed REIT, Non-listed REIT, Private REIT, Equity Fund, 
Insurance, Investment Manager and Pension Fund). A property matching technique is applied as 
a preliminary step, following Wiley (2012, 2013). Based on the matching process, if the matching 
criteria are overly restrictive, then only a small number of matched pairs will be generated. If the 
criteria are too loose, the matching may not effectively resolve sample selection issues. I adopt the 
criteria used in Wiley (2012) where REIT-purchased properties are matched with non-REIT-
purchased properties by submarket (same submarket), property class (same class), property age 
(within five years range), property size (within 40% range) and transaction date (within two years 
range). Propensity-score matching methods (Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010) are also used as a 
robustness check. 
The market-wide PNAV, tNAV , is the annual average of individual REITs PNAV 
(

tiNAV , ). The transaction price of a property is modeled as 
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(11)    11ln t
t
tt NAVListedREITBTMXPrice . 
M  is a vector of indicator variables for the market and tT  is the annual indicator variables for time 
period t  when the transaction occurred. The annual frequency of the analysis is appropriate when 
considering the amount of time required between initial observing PNAV deviations until the 
completed acquisition of new properties. The steps involved include equity issuance, property 
search and deal closing. Supporting the argument for a one-year lag is the observed differences 
shown in Figure 2 (previously discussed). B is a vector of indicator variables for investor types, 
including Listed REIT. X is a vector of physical characteristics as summarized in Table 9. As a 
robustness check, PNAV enters into model (10) in the form of dummy as Premium (equals 1 if 

tNAV  > 0; 0 otherwise).  
Table 9 ■ Property physical characteristics variables. 
Variables 
Age Log of building age.  
Building Size Log of building size (SF).  
Lot Size Log of lot size (SF).  
Stories Number of floors. Office 
Units Number of units. Multifamily 
Unit Size Typical unit size (SF). Multifamily 
Building Class Class A, B and C. Office, Multifamily 
Notes: This table summarizes the physical characteristic variables for purchase price model. 
 
Summary statistics for property purchases, prior to the matching procedure, are reported in 
Table 10. Listed REITs account for up to 8% of pre-matched transactions in the CoStar dataset.  
47 
 
Table 10 ■ Property purchase summary statistics (without matching). 
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Retail (N = 10,075) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 5,573 16,637 50 766,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 8.02 7.65 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 37,960 70,782 10,000 1,981,419 
Land Size (SF) 170,899 334,404 182 8,058,600 
Number of Floors 1 1 1 117 
Age 38 28 1 316 
Exchange 0.07    
Distress 0.09    
Listed REIT 0.08    
 
Panel B: Office (N = 12,542) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 19,370 66,123 50 2,800,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 8.19 7.55 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 93,336 179,867 10,000 4,400,000 
Land Size (SF) 146,552 691,904 139 65,514,240 
Number of Floors 5 7 1 100 
Age 37 28 1 224 
Class A 0.19    
Class B 0.59    
Class C 0.22    
Exchange 0.05    
Distress 0.09    
Listed REIT 0.05    
 
Panel C: Multifamily (N = 13,169) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 10,014 24,412 50 808,800 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 8.25 7.48 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 80,970 136,297 10,000 3,000,000 
Land Size (SF) 176,311 933,600 209 87,686,280 
Number of Floors 3 3 1 76 
Number of Units 85 133 0 3,221 
Typical Floor Size 28,588 47,826 4 802,018 
Age 51 27 1 216 
Class A 0.07    
Class B 0.24    
Class C 0.69    
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Exchange 0.12    
Distress 0.08    
Listed REIT 0.03    
Notes: This table reports summary statistics before the matching procedure is applied. Listed REIT 
indicates listed REIT buyer. 1tNAV  is market wide annual average of PNAVs collected from 
Green Street Advisors. Exchange indicates 1031 exchange transaction. Distress sale includes REO, 
auction, short sale, bankruptcy sale and any other distressed sales. All transactions occur during 
the January 2001-December 2014 period. The transactions data is collected from CoStar. The 
dataset is limited to include only transactions with sale prices of at least $50,000 and building size 
of at least 10,000 SF. Transactions from submarkets which have less than 100 transactions during 
the sample period are excluded. 
 
A refined dataset is then generated from the characteristic matching procedure and 
excluding individuals and corporate/users. An overview of the matched samples property dataset 
is displayed in Table 11, which highlights the consistency among average property size for the 
various investor types. Summary statistics are provided in Table 12. After the matching procedure 
is applied to the dataset, Listed REITs account for between 24 to 30% of the sample.  
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Table 11 ■ Property purchases by institutional investors (with characteristics matching). 
 Retail Office Multifamily 
 N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) 
Listed REIT 370 11,826 59,690 335 70,541 217,775 176 46,896 292,741 
Equity Fund 37 5,754 41,112 88 77,180 211,830 60 34,812 220,443 
Insurance 21 10,769 42,193 51 34,942 135,102 28 77,603 224,896 
Investment Manager 414 9,095 45,197 561 63,323 198,723 369 48,403 295,592 
Non-listed REIT 230 7,633 46,973 52 56,927 229,016 60 53,541 319,829 
Pension Fund 34 13,084 43,825 44 85,838 260,209 34 105,450 259,025 
Private REIT 112 8,005 41,895 91 32,278 143,673 21 32,135 265,900 
Total 1,218            1,222               748    
Notes: This table reports mean values for the property purchases by investor types after characteristic matching. Transactions were 
completed during January 2001-December 2014. Data is collected from CoStar. All transactions occur during the January 2001-
December 2014 period. The transactions data is collected from CoStar. Listed REIT indicates publicly-traded REITs. The dataset is 
limited to include only transactions with sale prices of at least $50,000 and building size of at least 10,000 SF. Transactions from 
submarkets which have less than 100 transactions during the sample period are excluded. 
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Table 12 ■ Property purchase summary statistics (with characteristics matching). 
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Retail (N = 1,218) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 9,587 12,877 253 170,500 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 2.40 5.25 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 49,417 50,243 10,000 556,549 
Land Size (SF) 266,274 318,559 3,005 3,812,806 
Number of Floors 1 3 1 117 
Age 17 11 2 100 
Exchange 0.03    
Distress 0.07    
Listed REIT 0.30    
 
Panel B: Office (N = 1,222) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 63,342 132,991 145 2,800,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 2.29 5.47 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 201,638 237,094 10,000 2,014,062 
Land Size (SF) 215,941 292,815 317 3,441,240 
Number of Floors 9 9 1 54 
Age 30 23 3 117 
Class A 0.61    
Class B 0.37    
Class C 0.02    
Exchange 0.02    
Distress 0.05    
Listed REIT 0.27    
 
Panel C: Multifamily (N = 748) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 50,600 42,456 1,158 592,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 2.18 5.44 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 285,695 200,192 11,258 3,000,000 
Land Size (SF) 547,235 1,670,168 827 43,516,440 
Number of Floors 5 4 1 35 
Number of Units 276 198 5 3,221 
Typical Floor Size 79,332 58,124 1,308 456,511 
Age 16 19 2 116 
Class A 0.69    
Class B 0.26    
Class C 0.05    
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Exchange 0.03    
Distress 0.06    
Listed REIT 0.24    
Notes: This table reports summary statistics with characteristics matching procedure. Listed REIT 
indicates listed REIT buyer. 1tNAV  is market wide annual average of PNAVs collected from 
Green Street Advisors. Exchange indicates 1031 exchange transaction. Distress sale includes REO, 
auction, short sale, bankruptcy sale and any other distressed sales. All transactions occur during 
the January 2001-December 2014 period. The transactions data is collected from CoStar. The 
dataset is limited to include only transactions with sale prices of at least $50,000 and building size 
of at least 10,000 SF. Transactions from submarkets which have less than 100 transactions during 
the sample period are excluded. 
 
When the premium to NAV is a market-wide phenomenon, REIT managers may compete 
for acquisitions and bid up purchase prices. The expected sign for the interaction term coefficient 
( 1 ) is positive (Hypothesis 3). On the other hand, selling strategy may be sticky due to managers’ 
incentives to preserve large portfolio size for management fees and minimum holding period 
regulations resulting from the dealer rule. Thus, discount to NAV may not necessarily lead to 
selling competition among REIT managers. Accordingly, the discount to NAV is not expected to 
have an impact on sale price; 1 is expected to be insignificant from zero in the sale price model. 
Following the property matching process, purchase premiums paid by listed REITs 
(coefficient for Listed REIT) are expected to be lower in magnitude when compared to the REIT 
acquisition premiums documented in previous research where the matched sampling procedure 
was not applied (Hypothesis 4). 
 
3.2.5 Equity Issuance (Hypothesis 5) 
Wiley (2013) examines stock performance following REIT asset sales. To obtain the abnormal 
stock return, he uses two REIT indices: (i) an all REIT index and (ii) a property type-specific REIT 
52 
 
index. The all REIT index is constructed by equally-weighting all securities listed under SIC code 
6798 from the CRSP database. For the property type-specific REIT index (office and apartment), 
a value-weighted index is used. The office REIT index is constructed from the global list of office 
REITs reported by Bloomberg. The apartment REIT index includes REITs in the global list of 
apartment REITs reported by Bloomberg. He uses a companion index technique to create the 
indices. The abnormal stock return is measured relative to the indices surrounding the property 
sale announcement day. 
Wiley examines abnormal stock returns over the short- and intermediate-horizon. For 
short-run, abnormal returns are observed for a time window ranging from five days to one day 
before the transaction (-5, -1) in order to investigate whether market anticipates the property sale. 
Another short-run window ranges from one day before to one day after the transaction (-1, +1). 
However, only a few transactions (less than 4%) are found to have corresponding press releases. 
This is the motivation for the evaluation of intermediate-horizon abnormal returns. The 
observation window ranges from one trading day to 25 trading days after the transaction (+1, +25). 
To investigate the impact of premium to NAV on REIT stock performance surrounding the 
new equity issuance announcement, the methodology in Wiley (2013) is followed. For REIT 
market return, CRSP/Ziman REIT indices are used. The data provides daily equal- and value-
weighted indices for all REITs and property types. Following Barber and Lyon (1997) abnormal 
returns during time from l to u, window (l, u), are estimated as cumulative abnormal return (CAR)2 
(12)  

u
lt
tt IRCAR )( . 
                                                 
2 Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) is blamed for compounding expected-return model’s problem, especially 
for long-term return (see Fama (1998) for detail). Thus, this dissertation only adopts CAR. However, in the unreported 
analyses, BHARs are applied and produce consistent results to CARs. 
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where tR  and tI  are daily stock returns and index returns respectively. Summary statistics for 
daily return for each index type are reported in Table 13. I use the value-weighted property type 
specific index as a benchmark. Similar to Brounen and Eichholtz (2001) and Wiley (2013), I 
analyze short-term windows of (0, +1) and (0, +2)3, intermediate term of (-15, -3) and (+3, +15) 
and long-term of (+3, +60) inclusive of intermediate-term and (+16, +60) exclusive of 
intermediate-term. 
Table 13 ■ Daily REIT indices returns.  
 Value weighted (%) Equal weighted (%) 
Property type Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
All REITs 0.04 1.95 0.04 1.69 
Equity REITs 0.04 2.00 0.05 1.81 
Unclassified 0.04 1.89 0.04 1.48 
Diversified 0.04 2.12 0.05 1.83 
Health Care 0.06 1.91 0.06 1.74 
Industrial/Office 0.03 2.16 0.04 2.01 
Lodging/Resorts 0.05 2.60 0.06 2.32 
Residential 0.04 2.05 0.04 1.70 
Retail 0.06 2.10 0.06 1.92 
Self Storage 0.07 1.99 0.07 1.93 
Notes: This table reports CRSP/Ziman daily REITs index returns (%) in value-weighted and equal-
weighted. Data runs from January 2001 to December 2014. 
 
Upon estimating CAR, two groups of firms are compared: the firms whose shares trade at 
premium on the announcement date (premium firms) and the firms whose share trade at discount 
(discount firms). Previous research finds negative stock performance following SEO for 
                                                 
3 Dann and Mikkelson (1984) investigate the convertible debt issuance and following stock price performance and 
find significant negative abnormal stock returns at the announcement date and issuance date. They examine issuance 
date because some terms are disclosed just prior to issuance such as the offering price, coupon interest rate and 
conversion ratio.  However, in this dissertation, substantial number of data miss issuance date (1,730 out of 2,560 
announcements). Also, among issuance date available data, more than 81% equities were issued within one day 
following the announcements which is overlapped in the short-term investigation windows. Thus, issuance date is not 
investigated in this dissertation. 
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conventional firms (Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar 1986). However, when shares 
trade at a premium to NAV, REITs can enjoy positive inter-market arbitrage by purchasing 
properties using proceeds from new equity issuance. Consequently, when there is a premium to 
NAV, new equity issues may convey a positive signal to the equity market. Thus, less severe 
negative abnormal returns are expected when equity issues announcements occur during a 
premium to NAV versus when new equity issues are announced as shares trade at a discount to 
NAV (Hypothesis 5).  
Abnormal returns are further investigated in light of capital structure theory. Abnormal 
returns are modeled as 
(13)    1,,2,1, tiiiji NAVTPRatioDebtEquityOfferSizeCAR  
for the cumulative abnormal return of firm i surrounding jth common equity issuance ( jiCAR , ).

tiNAV ,  is PNAV at the month of announcement t. PNAV is lagged by one month considering one 
month delayed NAV estimation reports. ,iOfferSize is gross offer amount divided by pre-offer 
market capitalization of the firm and ,iRatioDebtEquity  is pre-offer total debt divided by pre-offer 
market capitalization of the firm. Quarterly subscript   indicates one quarter ahead of 
announcement quarter. Vector P and T include property type and year indicators, respectively. 
Summary statistics are provided in Table 14. Both premium and discount firms experience short-
term negative stock price reactions following the SEO announcement, CAR(0, +1) and CAR(0, 
+2). Discount firms have larger equity issues and higher debt ratios compared to the offerings 
made by firms with premium to NAV. 
Table 14 ■ Common equity offerings summary statistics.  
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
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Panel A: All offerings (135 REITs) 
CAR(0, +1) 732 -1.38 3.94 -26.28 42.75 
CAR(0, +2)  -1.36 3.96 -25.72 34.43 
CAR(-15, -3)  0.70 4.92 -21.30 40.36 
CAR(+3, +15)  0.07 4.13 -27.58 23.44 
CAR(+3, +60)  0.30 8.56 -46.72 54.37 
CAR(+16, +60)  0.23 7.77 -32.81 65.35 
PNAV  3.57 18.43 -64.84 61.33 
Offer Size Ratio  0.15 0.24 0.00 4.68 
Debt Equity Ratio  1.23 1.86 0.01 38.13 
 
Panel B: Offerings at premium to NAV (109 REITs) 
CAR(0, +1) 456 -1.25 2.38 -11.07 11.50 
CAR(0, +2)  -1.17 2.71 -12.41 13.70 
CAR(-15, -3)  0.26 3.40 -14.57 16.04 
CAR(+3, +15)  0.15 3.43 -13.07 23.44 
CAR(+3, +60)  0.13 6.70 -22.10 50.51 
CAR(+16, +60)  -0.02 6.03 -21.73 27.07 
PNAV  14.02 11.75 0.10 61.33 
Offer Size Ratio  0.11 0.09 0.00 0.62 
Debt Equity Ratio  0.94 0.82 0.01 10.90 
 
Panel B: Offerings at discount to NAV (112 REITs) 
CAR(0, +1) 276 -1.60 5.64 -26.28 42.75 
CAR(0, +2)  -1.68 5.41 -25.72 34.43 
CAR(-15, -3)  1.43 6.66 -21.30 40.36 
CAR(+3, +15)  -0.06 5.10 -27.58 16.26 
CAR(+3, +60)  0.59 10.97 -46.72 54.37 
CAR(+16, +60)  0.65 10.01 -32.81 65.35 
PNAV  -13.71 13.93 -64.84 -0.05 
Offer Size Ratio  0.22 0.36 0.00 4.68 
Debt Equity Ratio  1.72 2.77 0.02 38.13 
Notes: This table reports common equity offerings summary statistics. Data is collected from SNL 
and runs from January 2001 to December 2014. CAR(l, u) indicates CAR during given time 
window of (l, u). PNAV is share price/NAV -1, Offer Size Ratio is gross offer amount divided by 
pre-offer market capitalization of the firm and Debt Equity Ratio is pre-offer total debt divided by 
pre-offer market capitalization of the firm. 
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 By investigating capital offerings of European property companies, Brounen and Eichholtz 
(2001) find evidence that supports the implied cash flow change hypothesis and debt market 
accessibility hypothesis. The implied cash flow change hypothesis argues that additional fund 
raising signals to the market that current net operating income is disappointing. The larger offer 
size results in a more severe negative stock price reaction to the announcement. In the debt market 
accessibility hypothesis, accessing debt market will be less attractive for a firm with high level of 
debt because the firm will be regarded as being risky for lenders. In that context, raising equity 
instead of debt is prudent. Accordingly, the negative stock price reaction is expected to be less 
severe for firms issuing equity when there is a high debt to equity level. The coefficient for NAV  
is expected to be positive since premium to NAV may carry positive signal about possible 
exploration of arbitrage opportunity (Hypothesis 5). 
 
3.2.6 Drivers of Pricing Differentials 
One of the primary focuses of this dissertation is to examine the consequences of pricing 
differentials, rather than the underlying causes. However, in conducting the analysis, I am able to 
briefly explore a few possible determinants of pricing differentials at the firm level. One of the 
possible factors considered is the REITs’ portfolio share in major metro markets, which may be 
considered to increase the quality and reduce the overall risk of the portfolio. The six major 
commercial real estate markets that comprise the Moody’s/RCA Commercial Property Price Index 
includes Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York and Washington DC. For REIT 
i , the major share in year t , tiShareMajor , , equals the number properties held in major markets 
divided by the total number of properties in the portfolio. In addition, the operating efficiency of 
the underlying assets may influence property values to deviate from stock market valuations. As a 
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property performance measure I use the EBIT Ratio (earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
total assets). The determinants of firm-level PNAV is modeled as 
(14) 
.,,6,5
,4,3,2,1,
tititi
tititititi
TPAgeFirmRatioDebt
SizeFirmRatioCashRatioEBITShareMajorPNAV




 
Other explanatory variables include Cash Ratio (cash-to-total assets ratio), Firm Size (log of total 
assets), Debt Ratio (debt-to-total assets ratio) and Firm Age (in years). Property type, P, and year, 
T, fixed effects are controlled. In addition to PNAV, I consider Relative PNAV which is defined 
as 
(15) ttiti PNAVPNAVPNAVRelative  ,, ,  
where tPNAV is market-wide annual PNAV average. In this case, year fixed effects are omitted 
and controlled by sector-wide changes in PNAV. Summary statistics for the measures related to 
firm-level PNAV are reported in Table 15. On average, REITs hold around 26% of properties in 
the major markets. 
Table 15 ■ Causes of PNAV summary statistics. 
Panel A: Correlation matrix. 
 PNAV 
Relative 
PNAV 
Major 
Share 
EBIT 
Ratio 
Cash 
Ratio 
Firm 
Size 
Debt 
Ratio 
Rel. PNAV 0.83       
Major Share 0.01 0.00      
EBIT Ratio 0.31 0.35 -0.03     
Cash Ratio -0.03 -0.05 0.26 -0.04    
Firm Size 0.09 0.11 0.14 -0.03 0.05   
Debt Ratio -0.18 -0.13 -0.06 -0.09 -0.08 0.06  
Firm Age 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.13 0.24 0.01 
 
Panel B: Explanatory Variables (155 REITs). 
 N Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
PNAV (%) 1,153 0.16 14.94 -52.17 65.45 
Rel. PNAV (%)  -5.28 13.54 -58.79 58.02 
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Major Share  0.26 0.25 0.00 1.00 
EBIT Ratio  0.05 0.03 -0.20 0.22 
Cash Ratio  0.03 0.03 0.00 0.34 
Firm Size  4,439 5,125 123 33,325 
Debt Ratio  0.48 0.14 0.00 1.04 
Firm Age  16.60 10.19 2.00 53.00 
Notes: PNAV = share price/NAV -1 and Relative PNAV = individual firm’s PNAV – market wide 
average PNAV. Major share is the number of properties in the major market (Boston, Chicago, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York and DC) relative to all property holdings. EBIT Ratio is 
EBIT to total assets ratio, Cash Ratio is cash to total assets ratio, Firm Size is total assets ($million), 
Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio and Firm Age is age of the firm in years. Data runs from 
2001 to 2014. Individual REIT’s premium/discount to NAV (PNAV) data and REIT property 
holdings are collected from SNL. Market-wide PNAV average is collected from Green Street 
Advisors. Firm fundamental data is collected from Compustat and CRSP database. 
 
PNAV may also be affected by stock market investor sentiment which affects the 
numerator of PNAV. Stock market investor sentiment is proxied by fund flows into real estate 
mutual funds. Data for mutual fund flows is collected from CRSP during the period of 2001-2014 
on a monthly basis. Real estate mutual funds are identified following Cici, Corgel and Gibson 
(2011) and Chou and Harding (2014) by searching fund names contain key words Real Estate, 
Realty and REIT. Then the data is restricted to actively managed domestic funds by excluding 
international key words Russell, Global (Glbl), International (Intl), European and Index. Fund 
flows are calculated as 
(16) 100
)1(
1,
,1,,
, 




ti
tititi
ti
TNA
rTNATNA
Flow , 
where tiTNA,  is total net asset value (TNA) of mutual fund i  at time t  and tir ,  is monthly mutual 
fund return. Mutual funds with less than 5% or greater than 95% quantile fund flows are dropped 
from the sample. Market-wide fund flow is the weighted average of all individual firm fund flows, 
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where the weights are each firm’s TNA. Figure 6 displays market-wide real estate mutual fund 
flow vs. PNAV. Upon visual inspection, PNAV appears to lag mutual fund flow. 
Figure 6 ■ Real estate mutual fund flow vs. PNAV. 
 
Note: This figure displays monthly real estate mutual fund flow change vs. PNAV. Fund flow is 
total net asset value weighted average. Fund flow for firm i  is calculated as 
100/)]1([ 1,,1,,,   tititititi TNArTNATNAFlow  where tiTNA,  is total net asset value of mutual 
fund i  at time t  and tir ,  is monthly mutual fund return. Mutual funds with less than 5% or greater 
than 95% quantile fund flows are dropped from the data. PNAV is market wide average PNAV. 
Data runs from January 2001 to December 2013. Mutual fund flow is collected from CRSP and 
PNAV data from Green Street Advisor. 
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CHAPTER FOUR ─ EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
4.1 Property Investment Activity (Hypothesis 1) 
This section discusses the impacts of PNAV on REIT property investment activity. When REIT 
shares trade at a premium (discount) to NAV, REIT managers can achieve positive arbitrage on 
the property market side by purchasing (selling) assets. REIT investment activities are measured 
by property acquisitions and dispositions (both in count and dollar value), and also by real estate 
investment growth. 
 
4.1.1 Premium to NAV and Real Estate Investment  
Table 16 reports the empirical results when real estate investment growth is used as the measure 
for investment activity. In column (1), PNAV has a positive and significant impact on REIT 
investment activity with an estimated coefficient of 0.35. An increase in PNAV by one standard 
deviation (15%) results in 5.3% increase in investment growth in the subsequent year. Considering 
the average real estate investment growth of 12% during the sample period, the result is 
economically meaningful. Next, the PNAV is differentiated with one variable for premium to NAV 
(zero otherwise) and a separate variable for discount to NAV. In column (2), the magnitude of 
premium to NAV is evaluated. A premium to NAV is found to increase investment activity. In 
column (3), the magnitude of NAV discounts enters the model. Discounted share prices relative to 
NAV results in lower investment activity by REITs. In aggregate, during periods when REIT 
shares trade at a premium to NAV, investment growth is 6.2% on average – shown in column (4). 
REIT managers tend to increase investment when they have more cash. Larger firm size and 
maturity correspond with reduced investment activity. 
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Table 16 ■ REIT investment activity regression: real estate investment growth. 
 (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Dependent variable: Real Estate Investment Growth 
Intercept 54.68 *** 3.78 51.53 *** 3.58 50.24 *** 3.44 47.48 *** 3.28 

1, tiNAV  0.35 
*** 5.27          



1,tiNAV   
  0.53 *** 5.40       



1,tiNAV   
     -0.26 ** -2.50    
Premium          6.23 *** 3.45 
Cash Ratio 115.07 *** 5.16 113.56 *** 5.10 117.21 *** 5.20 115.29 *** 5.13 
Firm Size -5.67 *** -6.72 -5.28 *** -6.38 -5.00 *** -5.90 -4.93 *** -5.94 
Debt Ratio -1.91  -0.33 -5.14  -0.88 -2.60  -0.44 -4.13  -0.70 
Firm Age -0.29 *** -3.63 -0.30 *** -3.81 -0.29 *** -3.54 -0.29 *** -3.62 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
             
 N 1,016            
Adj. R2 0.16   0.16   0.14   0.15   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the regression result using real estate investment growth as an investment 
activity dependent variable. Real estate investment growth is growth rate in real estate investment 
of REITs during a given year, t , collected from SNL. 

tiNAV ,  is premium/discount to net asset 
value of REIT i  at time t  ( 1/ ,, titi NAVprice ). ),0max( ,,

titi NAVNAV 

 and 
)),0(min( ,,

titi NAVabsNAV 

. Premium indicates 01, 

tiNAV . Cash Ratio is cash to total assets 
ratio, Firm Size is log of total assets, Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio and Firm Age is age of 
the firm in years. Property Type and Year indicate the property type and year fixed effect controls. 
 
As a measure of investment activity, real estate investment growth provides a somewhat 
limited measure in that it accounts for net acquisition/disposition activity, rather than total 
investment. To more directly quantify total acquisitions and dispositions, property transaction 
counts are included as a substitute for the investment growth variable. Table 17 provides the 
empirical results when transaction counts are considered, with acquisitions considered in Panel A. 
Acquisitions are measured as total acquisition count relative to the existing portfolio count. The 
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existing portfolio count is average of beginning- and end-of-year existing property count. The 
magnitude of PNAV has a positive and significant impact on the total number of acquisitions in 
the subsequent period. The estimated coefficient of 0.13 implies that a one standard deviation 
increase in the PNAV (15%) increases the number of acquisitions by 2% relative to the existing 
portfolio size. In column (2), NAV premiums are found to increase investment with an estimated 
coefficient of 0.23. A one standard deviation increase in the NAV premium leads to a 3.5% 
increase in acquisitions. In column (3), discount to NAV appears to have no impact on acquisition 
activity. In column 4, Overall, REITs increase property acquisition counts by 3.3% during periods 
when REIT shares trade at any premium to NAV.  
Panel B of Table 17 reports the analysis for disposition activity. Dispositions are measured 
as total disposition count relative to the existing portfolio count. In column (1), PNAV negatively 
impacts disposition activity with an estimated coefficient of -0.12. A one standard deviation 
increase in the PNAV results in an estimated 1.8% reduction in property dispositions. In column 
(2), the magnitude of NAV premiums lead to reduced levels of disposition activity. In column (3), 
the magnitude of NAV discounts lead to increases in disposition activity. In column (4), REITs 
are less inclined to sell their properties during periods when shares trade at any premium to NAV.  
Panel C of Table 17 reports the results for net acquisition activity, calculated as the total 
count of acquisitions minus the total count of dispositions divided by the existing portfolio count. 
The magnitude of NAV premiums is found to have a positive and significant impact on net 
acquisition activity; the magnitude of NAV discounts has a negative and significant impact. In 
column (4), net acquisition activity increases by 5.4% during periods when shares trade at any 
positive premium to NAV. The results in Panel C also suggest that firms with high debt ratios are 
less likely to participate as net buyers in the property market. 
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Table 17 ■ REIT investment activity regression: count based. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Acquisition (count based) 
Intercept 26.78 *** 3.46 25.85 *** 3.36 24.57 *** 3.16 24.21 *** 3.14 

1, tiNAV  0.13 
*** 3.65          



1,tiNAV   
  0.23 *** 4.29       



1,tiNAV   
     -0.07  -1.17    
Premium          3.31 *** 3.40 
Cash Ratio 70.56 *** 5.88 70.10 *** 5.85 71.64 *** 5.93 70.54 *** 5.87 
Firm Size -2.64 *** -5.76 -2.53 *** -5.66 -2.32 *** -5.08 -2.43 *** -5.43 
Debt Ratio -5.28  -1.61 -6.63 ** -2.05 -5.92 * -1.78 -6.07 * -1.87 
Firm Age -0.18 *** -4.13 -0.19 *** -4.23 -0.18 *** -4.00 -0.18 *** -4.11 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
             
 N 988            
Adj. R2 0.16   0.17   0.15   0.16   
 
Panel B: Dependent variable: Disposition (count based) 
Intercept -5.77  -1.11 -4.05  -0.78 -5.08  -0.98 -3.23  -0.62 

1, tiNAV  -0.12 
*** -5.04          



1,tiNAV   
  -0.12 *** -3.39       



1,tiNAV   
     0.16 *** 4.19    
Premium          -2.13 *** -3.22 
Cash Ratio 11.72  1.45 11.51  1.42 10.90  1.35 11.40  1.40 
Firm Size 0.35  1.13 0.11  0.38 0.23  0.77 0.08  0.28 
Debt Ratio 2.10  0.96 3.33  1.52 1.72  0.77 2.98  1.35 
Firm Age 0.15 *** 4.88 0.15 *** 4.86 0.14 *** 4.71 0.14 *** 4.79 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
             
 N 988            
Adj. R2 0.12   0.10   0.11   0.10   
 
 
Table 17 ■ REIT investment activity regression: count based - continued. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Panel C: Dependent variable: Net Acquisition (count based) 
Intercept 32.55 *** 3.69 29.89 *** 3.40 29.65 *** 3.32 27.43 *** 3.11 

1, tiNAV  0.25 
*** 6.18          



1,tiNAV   
  0.35 *** 5.76       



1,tiNAV   
     -0.22 *** -3.46    
Premium          5.44 *** 4.86 
Cash Ratio 58.84 *** 4.30 58.59 *** 4.27 60.74 *** 4.38 59.15 *** 4.29 
Firm Size -2.99 *** -5.72 -2.65 *** -5.16 -2.56 *** -4.87 -2.51 *** -4.90 
Debt Ratio -7.37 ** -1.98 -9.95 *** -2.68 -7.64 ** -2.01 -9.05 ** -2.43 
Firm Age -0.33 *** -6.50 -0.33 *** -6.57 -0.32 *** -6.23 -0.33 *** -6.41 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
             
 N 988            
Adj. R2 0.18   0.18   0.16   0.17   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the regression result using property transaction count based acquisition, 
disposition and net acquisition as an investment activity dependent variable. 

tiNAV ,  is premium to 
net asset value of REIT i  at time t  ( 1/ ,, titi NAVprice ). ),0max( ,,

titi NAVNAV 

 and 
)),0(min( ,,

titi NAVabsNAV 

. Premium indicates 01, 

tiNAV . Cash Ratio is cash to total assets 
ratio, Firm Size is log of total assets, Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio and Firm Age is age of 
the firm in years. Property Type and Year indicate the property type and year fixed effect controls. 
 
Results for acquisition and disposition activity based on total transaction values, rather than 
property counts, are analyzed in Table 18. Acquisitions are measured as total acquisition value 
divided by existing portfolio value. The existing portfolio value is average of beginning- and end-
of-year existing property value. Previously discussed, SNL data may underestimate the total value 
of acquisitions due to missing data for land purchases or development sites. In column (2) of Panel 
A, the magnitude of NAV premiums are found increase the total dollar amount of acquisition 
activity in the subsequent period with an estimated coefficient of 0.19. A unit standard deviation 
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increase in NAV premiums (15%) increases the dollar amount of subsequent acquisition activity 
by 2.9%. In column (4), REIT managers increase the dollar amount of acquisitions by 3.7%, on 
average, during periods when shares trade at a premium to NAV.  
Panel B of Table 18 presents the results for disposition activity based on the total dollar 
value of assets sold. Dispositions are measured as the total value of dispositions divided by existing 
property value. NAV premiums are found to have a negative impact on the dollar amount of 
dispositions in the following year. In column (2), the magnitude of NAV premiums leads to lower 
disposition volume. In column (3), the magnitude of NAV discounts lead to an increase total dollar 
amount of disposition activity. In addition, the net dollar amount of transactions volume relative 
to the existing portfolio value is evaluated in Panel C with consistent results to those obtained 
using transaction counts. 
Table 18 ■ REIT investment activity regression: value based. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Acquisition (value based) 
Intercept 43.57 *** 6.51 43.57 *** 6.65 41.05 *** 6.14 41.80 *** 6.43 

1, tiNAV  0.07 
 
1.22          



1,tiNAV   
  0.19 ** 2.22       



1,tiNAV   
     0.04 
 
0.44    
Premium          3.72 ** 2.41 
Cash Ratio 83.00 *** 4.40 82.80 *** 4.40 84.09 *** 4.45 82.87 *** 4.40 
Firm Size -3.45 *** -4.67 -3.47 *** -4.84 -3.09 *** -4.20 -3.48 *** -4.87 
Debt Ratio -8.89 * -1.71 -9.66 * -1.87 -9.57 * -1.83 -9.02 * -1.75 
Firm Age -0.14 * -1.93 -0.15 ** -2.01 -0.14 ** -1.96 -0.14 * -1.93 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
             
 N 857            
Adj. R2 0.11   0.12   0.11   0.12    
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Panel B: Dependent variable: Disposition (value based) 
Intercept -0.31  -0.11 0.73  0.27 0.31  0.11 1.55 0.57 

1, tiNAV  -0.07 
*** -2.99         



1,tiNAV   
  -0.08 ** -2.41      



1,tiNAV   
     0.08 ** 2.08   
Premium          -0.76  -1.18 
Cash Ratio 13.08 * 1.68 12.70  1.63 12.72  1.63 12.43  1.59 
Firm Size 0.57 * 1.88 0.43  1.44 0.48  1.57 0.36  1.21 
Debt Ratio 0.51  0.24 1.07  0.50 0.32  0.15 0.84  0.39 
Firm Age 0.03  0.86 0.03  0.97 0.02  0.79 0.03  0.89 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
             
 N 857            
Adj. R2 0.07   0.07   0.07   0.06   
 
 
 
Table 18 ■ REIT investment activity regression: value based - continued. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Panel C: Dependent variable: Net Acquisition (value based) 
Intercept 43.88 *** 6.91 42.84 *** 6.89 40.75 *** 6.40 40.25 *** 6.52 

1, tiNAV  0.14 
*** 2.58          



1,tiNAV   
  0.27 
*** 3.39       



1,tiNAV   
     -0.04 
 -0.44    
Premium          4.47 *** 3.06 
Cash Ratio 69.92 *** 3.90 70.10 *** 3.92 71.37 *** 3.97 70.44 *** 3.94 
Firm Size -4.02 *** -5.73 -3.89 *** -5.74 -3.57 *** -5.09 -3.84 *** -5.65 
Debt Ratio -9.40 * -1.91 -10.72 ** -2.18 -9.89 ** -1.99 -9.87 ** -2.01 
Firm Age -0.17 ** -2.40 -0.18 ** -2.54 -0.17 ** -2.41 -0.17 ** -2.42 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
             
 N 857            
Adj. R2 0.13   0.13   0.12   0.13   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
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Notes: This table reports the regression result using property transaction value based acquisition, 
disposition and net acquisition as an investment activity dependent variable. 

tiNAV ,  is premium to 
net asset value of REIT i  at time t  ( 1/ ,, titi NAVprice ). ),0max( ,,

titi NAVNAV 

 and 
)),0(min( ,,

titi NAVabsNAV 

. Premium indicates 01, 

tiNAV . Cash Ratio is cash to total assets 
ratio, Firm Size is log of total assets, Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio and Firm Age is age of 
the firm in years. Property Type and Year indicate the property type and year fixed effect controls. 
 
 
4.1.2 Threshold Premium 
Due to high search and transactions costs in commercial real estate, it is possible that a 
minimum threshold for NAV premiums or discounts is required before REIT managers will take 
action in the property market. To evaluate this question, Table 19 provides results from the 
estimation of real estate investment growth with PNAV entering the model as a categorical 
variable. The results reveal that even relatively small NAV premiums (less than 5%) appear to 
trigger REIT managers to increase their net real estate investment activity. Discussed previously, 
mispricings between the property and stock market are relatively cyclical and persistent over a 
time-series. Even relatively small premiums are indicative of a period with favorable conditions 
for property acquisitions. The magnitude of the increase in real estate investment activity is 
considerably higher corresponding with periods of higher NAV premiums (10% or greater). By 
maintaining assets under management, REIT managers enjoy management fees, which creates 
incentives to expand the property portfolio (Graff 2001). With embedded incentives to expand, 
even a relatively small NAV premium can serve as rationale to the board for increasing net 
investment.  
Table 19 ■ REIT real estate investment growth: threshold premium. 
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  Coefficient t-value 
Intercept 49.61 *** 3.42 
PNAV [-15, -10) -1.43  -0.44 
PNAV [-10, -5) 1.95  0.63 
PNAV [-5, 0) 4.16  1.36 
PNAV [0, 5) 6.34 ** 2.02 
PNAV [5, 10) 5.95 * 1.79 
PNAV [10, 15) 12.00 *** 3.25 
PNAV [15, ∞) 15.59 *** 4.24 
Cash Ratio 116.33 *** 5.19 
Firm Size -5.48 *** -6.46 
Debt Ratio -3.02  -0.52 
Firm Age -0.29 *** -3.66 
Property Type YES     
Year YES     
        
 N 1,016     
Adj. R2 0.16     
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05; *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the regression result using real estate investment growth as an investment 
activity dependent variable. PNAV [a, b) is an indicator variable which means bNAVa ti  

1, . 
Cash Ratio is cash to total assets ratio, Firm Size is log of total assets, Debt Ratio is debt to total 
assets ratio and Firm Age is age of the firm in years. Property Type and Year indicate the property 
type and year fixed effect controls. 
 
A factor that is expected to mitigate “arbitrage” opportunities is the high transaction costs involved 
in commercial real estate transactions, including brokerage commission fees. Many REITs are 
internally-advised, with in-house real estate transaction experts. Table 20 summarizes the 
distribution of acquisitions and dispositions in the CoStar data that involve a real estate broker, by 
investor type. Overall, REITs tend to use brokers less frequently than other investors. Brokers are 
also less involved in the acquisition side (for Buyers) than on the disposition side (for Sellers). 
Across the board as Buyers, REITs involve real estate brokers in acquisitions at the lowest 
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frequency of all investor types. Only 14 to 20% of REIT acquisitions involved broker 
representation. The ability of REITs to economize on transaction costs suggests that even small 
share price premiums to NAV are indicative of conditions that are favorable to increased property 
investment activity.  
Table 20 ■ Property transactions with brokers. 
 Retail  Office  Multifamily 
Buyer All 
With 
broker %  All 
With 
broker %  All 
With 
broker % 
Equity Funds 299 67 22.41  545 130 23.85  668 230 34.43 
Insurance 107 24 22.43  339 108 31.86  76 16 21.05 
Investment 
Manager 1,535 476 31.01  3,089 859 27.81  2,743 846 30.84 
Pension Fund 84 22 26.19  183 46 25.14  106 23 21.70 
Private REIT 686 153 22.30  582 110 18.90  233 70 30.04 
REIT 3,410 486 14.25  1,558 259 16.62  848 176 20.75 
Total 6,121 1,228   6,296 1,512   4,674 1,361  
            
 
Seller All 
With 
broker %  All 
With 
broker %  All 
With 
broker % 
Equity Funds 366 229 62.57  517 401 77.56  377 296 78.51 
Insurance 196 150 76.53  438 359 81.96  166 144 86.75 
Investment 
Manager 1,502 1,112 74.03  2,587 2,078 80.32  2,197 1,757 79.97 
Pension Fund 80 59 73.75  205 168 81.95  97 75 77.32 
Private REIT 158 114 72.15  282 229 81.21  147 111 75.51 
REIT 2,076 1,361 65.56  1,026 658 64.13  1,014 695 68.54 
Total 4,378 3,025   5,055 3,893   3,998 3,078  
Notes: This table reports the number of property transactions involving brokers. Transactions were 
executed from 2001 to 2014. Data is collected from CoStar. 
 
 
4.1.3 Opportunistic Sale vs. Liquidation 
An alternative explanation is that REIT property sales may be largely motivated by financial 
distress, which simply happens to coincide with periods that are marked by discounts to NAV. A 
number of REITs experienced financial distress during the most recent financial crisis. To evaluate 
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this shock, the sample is divided into pre-crisis (2001-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post-crisis 
(2010-2014) periods. In abbreviated reporting for the investment equations, coefficients for NAV 
premiums only are reported in Table 21. During all three periods, when REITs shares trade at 
premiums (



1,tiNAV ), managers increase their investment in real estate (Investment Growth) and 
purchase a higher number of properties (Acquisitions). Also persistent over the three periods, REIT 
managers increase the number of property dispositions (Dispositions) when shares trade at 
discount to NAV (



1,tiNAV ). Evidence for a linkage between NAV discounts and disposition 
activity that occurs outside the financial crisis suggests that the results in this dissertation are not 
the byproduct of an alternative financial constraint explanation. 
Table 21 ■ REIT investment activity by sub-periods. 
  
(1) Pre-crisis 
(2001-2006) 
 
(2) Crisis 
(2007-2009) 
 
(3) Post-crisis 
(2010-2014) 
  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
Investment Growth           

1, tiNAV  0.72 
*** 5.02  0.32 **  2.48  0.23 **  2.29 



1,tiNAV  0.73 
***  3.67  0.51 * 1.71  0.44 *** 3.08 



1,tiNAV  -1.28 
***  -4.41  -0.30 ** -1.99  -0.05  -0.33 
            
Acquisitions: count based         

1, tiNAV  0.25 
*** 3.37  0.19 ** 2.25  0.06  1.25 



1,tiNAV  0.20 
** 2.10  0.52 *** 2.66  0.20 *** 2.63 



1,tiNAV  -0.52 
*** -3.63  -0.13  -1.28  0.07  0.84 
            
Dispositions: count based         

1, tiNAV  -0.05 
 -1.12  -0.14 *** -3.07  -0.11 *** -2.90 



1,tiNAV  -0.01 
 -0.13  -0.08  -0.81  -0.14 ** -2.50 



1,tiNAV  0.17 
** 2.05  0.16 *** 3.15  0.11 * 1.83 
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N 282    249    485   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the coefficients for NAV premium/discount by sub-periods using real 
estate investment growth and count based acquisitions and dispositions as an investment activity 
dependent variable. Real estate investment growth is growth rate in real estate investment of REITs 
during a given year, t , collected from SNL.

tiNAV ,  is premium/discount to net asset value of REIT 
i  at time t  ( 1/ ,, titi NAVprice ). ),0max( ,,

titi NAVNAV 

 and )),0(min( ,,

titi NAVabsNAV 

. 
 
 Apart from the financial crisis, an alternative measure to financial constraints includes the 
EBIT Ratio (earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets). Table 22 presents results for 
REIT investment activity with EBIT Ratio included as a control. Firms with low EBIT are more 
active in both acquisitions and dispositions (columns 1 and 2). However, EBIT has no significant 
impact on net acquisitions or net real estate investment growth (columns 3 and 4). REITs seem to 
actively reposition their assets by selling and purchasing properties when they are less profitable. 
Although low profitability increases divestiture and investment activity, it is not related to a 
significant net change of investment in either direction. Importantly, NAV premiums are persistent 
as a significant factor in all investment metrics. 
Table 22 ■ REIT investment activity and profitability. 
 (1) 
Acquisitions 
(2) 
Dispositions 
(3) 
Net Acquisitions 
(4) 
RE Growth 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Intercept 31.47 *** 3.96 2.16  0.41 29.31 *** 3.23 53.09 *** 3.57 

1, tiNAV  0.15 
*** 4.12 -0.09 *** -3.58 0.24 *** 5.68 0.34 *** 5.06 
EBIT Ratio -44.64 ** -2.41 -75.37 *** -6.17 30.73  1.46 15.25  0.46 
Cash Ratio 69.70 *** 5.82 10.27  1.30 59.44 *** 4.35 115.13 *** 5.16 
Firm Size -2.77 *** -6.02 0.13  0.43 -2.90 *** -5.52 -5.62 *** -6.61 
Debt Ratio -5.97 * -1.83 0.92  0.43 -6.89 * -1.85 -1.67  -0.29 
Firm Age -0.17 *** -3.71 0.17 *** 5.88 -0.34 *** -6.66 -0.30 *** -3.65 
Property 
Type 
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
YES 
  
Year YES   YES   YES   YES   
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 N 988   988   988   1,016   
Adj. R2 0.17   0.15   0.18   0.16   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the regression result using real estate investment growth and count based 
acquisitions, dispositions and net acquisitions as an investment activity dependent variable. Real 
estate investment growth is growth rate in real estate investment of REITs during a given year, t , 
collected from SNL. 

tiNAV ,  is premium/discount to net asset value of REIT i  at time t  
( 1/ ,, titi NAVprice ). EBIT Ratio is EBIT to total assets ratio, Cash Ratio is cash to total assets 
ratio, Firm Size is log of total assets, Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio and Firm Age is age of 
the firm in years. Property Type and Year indicate the property type and year fixed effect controls. 
 
This section examines how PNAV affects REIT managers’ property investment activities. 
The evidence is provided under a range of alternative empirical tests, and the findings consistently 
suggest that REIT managers purchase (sell) more properties when their shares trade at a premium 
(discount) to NAV. The evidence provided in this section is fully supportive of Hypothesis 1. 
 
4.2 Going Public (Hypothesis 2-1) 
To accomplish positive arbitrage, managers may act at the firm level instead of trading individual 
properties. If management of a privately-held real estate fund expects their shares to trade at 
premium to NAV in the public market, they may decide to go public – effectively selling the entire 
portfolio of underlying assets to the public market at a higher price. Panel A of Figure 3 (previously 
covered) shows the annual PNAV and count of IPOs for the REIT sector as a whole. IPO 
announcements appear to increase when the REIT industry encounters a period of market-wide 
premiums to NAV. The two series exhibit a high degree of positive correlation, with correlation 
coefficient 0.71. Since share prices are unobserved for private companies, I am unable to evaluate 
PNAVs at the individual firm level. Visually, Figure 3 and the high degree of positive correlation 
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are supportive of the expectation (Hypothesis 2-1) that the private real estate firms have an 
increased propensity to go public during periods when REIT shares trade at a premium to NAV.  
 
4.3 Becoming M&A Target (Hypothesis 2-2) 
If a publicly-listed REIT has shares trading at a discount to NAV, management may be supportive 
of M&A which would effectively result in selling of the entire portfolio at a price commensurate 
with the property market valuation. Table 23 reports the results of the logit estimation for the 
probability of becoming an M&A target. When PNAV enters as a continuous variable (ranging 
from discount to premium), the coefficient is negative and significant (model 1). Firms are more 
likely to become an M&A target when shares trade at a discount to NAV. In model 2, only the 
magnitude of discount (in absolute value) is included in the estimation. The estimated coefficient 
is positive and significant indicating that a greater discount in share price increases the probability 
of M&A. Supporting Hypothesis 2-2, listed REITs are more likely to become an M&A target when 
their shares trade at a discount to NAV. 
 
Table 23 ■ REIT M&A target probability regression. 
  (1)  (2) 
 Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
Intercept -8.19  -0.47  -8.42 
 -0.48 

tNAV  -0.04 
** -2.18   
 
 

tNAV   
   0.06 *** 2.75 
Firm Size 0.87  0.46  0.90  0.47 
Debt Ratio -0.14  -0.09  -0.44  -0.28 
Cash Ratio -4.96  -0.88  -4.11  -0.72 
EBIT Ratio -21.66 ** -2.12  -21.08 ** -2.06 
Interest Coverage 0.06 * 1.86  0.05  1.52 
Property Type YES 
   YES   
Cluster 55   55  
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 N 427    427   
Log-lik. -132.41    -131.03   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the logit regression results of being merger and acquisition (M&A) target. 
A subject REIT is matched to the control REITs which are same year with the subject REIT and 
in ±20% range of firm size. NAV  is three-month average premium/discount to NAV prior to 
M&A announcement. 
NAV  is size of discount which is )),0(min( NAVabs . Followings are 
one year lagged variables: Firm Size is log of total assets, Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio, 
EBIT Ratio is EBIT to total assets ratio and Cash Ratio is cash to total assets ratio. Property Type 
and matching Clusters are controlled.  
 
4.4 Property Purchase Price Premium (Hypothesis 3 & 4) 
This section explores how the market-wide PNAV impacts transactions prices for REIT assets in 
the property market. During periods when the REIT sector as a whole encounters premiums to 
NAV, there is competition for desirable acquisitions in order to exploit the positive arbitrage 
opportunity. Competition among REIT managers may act to bid up property prices, particularly 
when REIT comprise a sufficiently large component of the acquisitions market. The property 
transactions data is conditioned using a characteristics matched sampling procedure to address 
potential sample selection bias issues that may have affected the estimated REIT premium 
estimated in prior studies.  
 
4.4.1 Property Purchase Price without Matching 
As a preliminary step, Table 24 reports the estimation of property purchase prices for the three 
property types for the full sample (prior to applying the matching procedure). In this sample, the 
buyer types include Corporate/User, Equity Fund, Individual, Insurance, Investment Manager, 
Pension Fund, Private REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT. Listed REIT is the reference buyer. 
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Coefficients on 1 tNAVREITListed  are positive and significant for all three property types, in 
line with expectations that listed REITs pay higher transactions prices when there is a market-wide 
share price premium to NAV for the sector. Individuals and corporate/users appear to pay 
significantly lower price when compared to listed REITs, consistent with previous studies (Hardin 
and Wolverton 1999; Lambson, McQueen and Slade 2004; Ling and Petrova 2009; Akin et al. 
2013). Shown in Table 5, individuals and corporate/users select substantially smaller size buildings 
compared to institutional investors such as listed REITs. Thus, the property pricing differential 
may be driven by sample selection issues rather than REIT clientele effects.  
Table 24 ■ Property purchase price regression (without matching). 
Dependent Retail Office Multifamily 
log(Sale Price) Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 2.826 *** 17.24 3.181 *** 13.06 0.990 *** 6.93 

1 tNAVREITListed  0.015 
*** 3.79 0.023 *** 3.97 0.013 *** 3.28 
Corporate/User -0.443 *** -10.06 -1.365 *** -20.12 -0.368 *** -7.42 
Equity Funds -0.029  -0.32 -0.086  -0.97 -0.155 *** -3.01 
Individual -0.543 *** -12.46 -1.696 *** -25.33 -0.384 *** -8.27 
Insurance -0.107  -0.94 -0.256 ** -2.50 0.033  0.38 
Investment Manager 0.044  0.84 -0.098  -1.44 -0.016  -0.34 
Non-listed REIT -0.029  -0.45 -0.070  -0.75 0.010  0.18 
Pension Fund 0.397 *** 3.17 0.161  1.41 0.162 ** 2.17 
Private REIT 0.140 ** 2.04 0.029  0.33 -0.111 * -1.72 
log(Building Size) 0.556 *** 37.18 0.469 *** 26.86 0.672 *** 55.51 
log(Land Size) 0.084 *** 8.80 0.079 *** 8.01 0.003  0.39 
Number of Floors 0.013 ** 2.36 0.020 *** 8.69 0.006 *** 2.91 
Number of Units       0.002 *** 21.55 
Number of Units2       0.000 *** -15.07 
Typical Floor Size       0.000  0.83 
Typical Floor Size2       0.000 *** -4.88 
Class B    -0.594 *** -17.54 -0.268 *** -11.18 
Class C    -0.713 *** -16.26 -0.456 *** -17.22 
log(Age) -0.414 *** -38.49 0.169 *** 10.65 -0.184 *** -19.08 
Exchange 0.336 *** 11.63 0.593 *** 13.05 0.113 *** 7.66 
Distress -0.595 *** -22.75 -0.257 *** -7.40 -0.483 *** -26.72 
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Property sub-type  Yes         
Sub-market Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Yes   Yes   Yes   
          
N 10,075   12,542   13,169   
Adj. R2 0.62   0.68   0.85   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports property purchase price regression prior to the matching procedure. 
Dependent variable is log of Sale Price. 1tNAV  is one year lagged market-wide PNAV average. 
Buyer type includes Corporate/User, Equity Fund, Individual, Insurance, Investment Manager, 
Pension Fund, Private REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT. The reference buyer type is Listed 
REIT. Building Size and Land Size are in square feet (SF) and logged. Number of Floors is count. 
For multifamily properties, Number of Units (count) and Typical Floor Size (SF) enter with 
squared terms. Building classes are Class A, Class B and Class C and Class A is reference. Age is 
in years and logged. Exchange indicates 1031 Exchange transaction. Distress includes sales with 
a remark of REO, auction, short sale, bankruptcy sale and any other distressed sales. For retail 
properties, Property sub-type includes Airport Retail, Strip Center, Lifestyle Center, 
Neighborhood Center, Community Center, Outlet Center, Power Center, Regional Mall and Super 
Regional Mall. Sub-markets are included if there are at least 100 transactions during January 2001 
- December 2014. Transaction Year is controlled. 
 
 
4.4.2 Property Purchase Price with Matching 
To address potential issues with sample selection bias, I limit the sample to include only 
transactions by institutional investors (Equity Fund, Insurance, Investment Manager, Pension 
Fund, Private REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT) and apply a characteristic matched 
sampling procedure. Listed REITs are distinguished from other institutional investors by a Listed 
REIT indicator variable. Table 25 presents results for the estimated impact of NAV premiums on 
the relative transaction prices paid by REIT investors. Estimated coefficients for the 

1 tNAVREITListed  interaction term are positive and significant in samples for all three property 
types. During the study period, at the average market-wide PNAV, which was 4.3% as provided 
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in Table 4, REITs paid premiums of 8.1%, 4.7% and 3.8% to purchase retail, office and 
multifamily properties, respectively. For retail properties, listed REITs pay lower prices by an 
estimated 14% when compared to other investors (using the baseline scenario when there is no 
market-wide premium to NAV). For office and multifamily, listed REITs pay acquisition prices 
that are statistically insignificant from prices paid by other institutional investors. These results are 
insightful to help explain the findings from previous studies. 27% of the listed REIT premium in 
the property transactions market in the previous studies is explained by either (i) sample selection 
issues, or (ii) "arbitrage" opportunities related directly to the sector-wide NAV premium.  
Table 25 ■ Property purchase price regression (with characteristics matching, Listed REIT vs. 
others). 
Dependent Retail Office Multifamily 
log(Sale Price) Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 
2.723 ** 1.97 -2.416 * -1.69 5.427 *** 4.79 

1 tNAVREITListed  
0.019 *** 3.18 0.011 ** 2.01 0.009 ** 2.01 
Listed REIT 
-0.139 ** -2.27 0.048  0.77 -0.056  -1.09 
log(Building Size) 
0.655 *** 5.84 1.128 *** 11.16 0.423 *** 4.74 
log(Land Size) 
0.013  0.40 -0.125 *** -5.57 -0.069 *** -3.72 
Number of Floors 
-0.009  -1.32 0.005  0.90 0.018 *** 3.38 
Number of Units       
0.006 *** 8.85 
Number of Units2       
0.000 *** -6.29 
Typical Floor Size       
0.000 ** -2.27 
Typical Floor Size2       
0.000  1.00 
log(Age) 
-0.347 *** -3.70 -0.029  -0.22 -0.216 *** -4.13 
Exchange 
0.118  1.07 0.120  0.93 -0.152 * -1.74 
Distress 
-0.803 *** -10.12 -0.350 *** -3.84 -0.354 *** -5.61 
Property sub-type  Yes         
Cluster Yes (370 clusters) Yes (335 clusters) Yes (176 clusters) 
Year Yes   Yes   Yes   
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N 1,218   1,222   748   
Adj. R2 0.68   0.80   0.81   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports property purchase price regression with characteristics matching 
procedure. Dependent variable is log of Sale Price. 1tNAV  is one year lagged market-wide PNAV 
average. Listed REIT indicates listed REIT buyer. Building Size and Land Size are in square feet 
(SF) and logged. Number of Floors is count. For multifamily properties, Number of Units (count) 
and Typical Floor Size (SF) enter with squared terms. Building classes are Class A, Class B and 
Class C and Class A is reference. Age is in years and logged. Exchange indicates 1031 Exchange 
transaction. Distress indicates sales with a remark of REO sale, auction sale, short sale, bankruptcy 
sale or distress sale. For retail properties, Property sub-type includes Airport Retail, Strip Center, 
Lifestyle Center, Neighborhood Center, Community Center, Outlet Center, Power Center, 
Regional Mall and Super Regional Mall. Sub-markets are included if there are at least 100 
transactions during January 2001 - December 2014. Clusters are indicators for matched groups. 
Matching procedure requires same Sub-market and building Class and other conditions. 
Transaction Year is controlled. 
 
In the next stage of the analysis, investor types are identified on a more granular level, 
including separate indicator variables for Equity Fund, Insurance, Investment Manager, Pension 
Fund, Private REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT. Listed REIT is used as the reference 
investor type. Table 26 reports the empirical results 4 . Consistent with previous results, the 
estimated coefficient for 1 tNAVREITListed  is positive and significant. For retail properties, 
listed REITs pay relatively less than other investors, with the exception of equity funds. For office, 
only insurance companies pay less than listed REITs. For multifamily, only equity funds pay less 
than the listed REITs. Taken together, apart from the strong influence from market-wide premiums 
                                                 
4 In untabulated analyses, I include a vacancy variable which results in substantial data loss. After including the 
vacancy variable, number of available observations is reduced from 1,218 to 93 for retail, from 1,222 to 505 for office 
and from 748 to 416 for multifamily. In spite of sample size issues, coefficients on PNAV for all property types are 
positive (retail and multifamily significant, office insignificant) and never negative, even after vacancy is accounted. 
The adjusted R2 for the estimation is 0.83.   
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to NAV, listed REITs do not appear to purchase properties at a significantly higher price when 
compared to other institutional investors. 
Table 26 ■ Property purchase price regression (with characteristics matching, investor types). 
Dependent Retail Office Multifamily 
log(Sale Price) Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 2.887 ** 2.09 -2.069  -1.43 5.284 *** 4.74 

1 tNAVREITListed  0.021 
*** 3.62 0.012 ** 2.12 0.010 ** 2.44 
Equity Fund -0.233 * -1.91 -0.122  -1.35 -0.118 * -1.68 
Insurance 0.107  0.72 -0.199 * -1.88 0.285 *** 3.27 
Investment Manager 0.136 ** 2.11 -0.045  -0.70 0.066  1.29 
Non-listed REIT 0.171 ** 2.33 0.016  0.15 0.063  0.94 
Pension Fund 0.256 ** 2.00 -0.018  -0.16 0.344 *** 4.07 
Private REIT 0.292 *** 3.31 0.060  0.66 -0.083  -0.90 
log(Building Size) 0.629 *** 5.62 1.097 *** 10.77 0.393 *** 4.47 
log(Land Size) 0.012  0.37 -0.129 *** -5.68 -0.048 *** -2.63 
Number of Floors -0.008  -1.29 0.006  0.96 0.020 *** 3.78 
Number of Units       0.006 *** 8.79 
Number of Units2       0.000 *** -6.31 
Typical Floor Size       0.000 ** -2.52 
Typical Floor Size2       0.000  1.21 
log(Age) -0.338 *** -3.61 0.007  0.05 -0.190 *** -3.73 
Exchange 0.142  1.29 0.104  0.80 -0.149 * -1.75 
Distress -0.736 *** -9.08 -0.353 *** -3.87 -0.365 *** -5.93 
Property sub-type  Yes         
Cluster Yes (370 clusters) Yes (335 clusters) Yes (176 clusters) 
Year Yes   Yes   Yes   
          
N 1,218   1,222   748   
Adj. R2 0.69   0.80   0.82   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports property purchase price regression with characteristics matching 
procedure. Dependent variable is log of Sale Price. 1tNAV  is one year lagged market-wide PNAV 
average. Investor type includes Equity Fund, Insurance, Investment Manager, Pension Fund, 
Private REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT. The reference buyer type is Listed REIT. Building 
Size and Land Size are in square feet (SF) and logged. Number of Floors is count. For multifamily 
properties, Number of Units (count) and Typical Floor Size (SF) enter with squared terms. Building 
classes are Class A, Class B and Class C and Class A is reference. Age is in years and logged. 
Exchange indicates 1031 Exchange transaction. Distress indicates sales with a remark of REO sale, 
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auction sale, short sale, bankruptcy sale or distress sale. For retail properties, Property sub-type 
includes Airport Retail, Strip Center, Lifestyle Center, Neighborhood Center, Community Center, 
Outlet Center, Power Center, Regional Mall and Super Regional Mall. Sub-markets are included 
if there are at least 100 transactions during January 2001 - December 2014. Clusters are indicators 
for matched groups. Matching procedure requires same Sub-market and building Class and other 
conditions. Transaction Year is controlled. 
 
The next layer of analysis evaluates the price impact by using a Premium indicator variable, 
which takes on a value of one if market-wide PNAV is positive and zero otherwise. Regression 
results with the Premium variable in place of PNAV are presented in Table 27. For retail, the 
estimated coefficient on the Listed REIT×Premium interaction term is positive and significant sign, 
consistent to previous analyses. For office and multifamily, the coefficient is positive but 
insignificant. This finding suggests that the magnitude of NAV premium is important when 
explaining the transaction premium paid by REIT managers.  
Table 27 ■ Property purchase price regression (with characteristics matching, premium dummy). 
Dependent Retail Office Multifamily 
log(Sale Price) Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 2.890 ** 2.10 -2.157  -1.49 5.241 *** 4.65 
Listed REIT×Premium 0.619 *** 4.00 0.204  1.36 0.151  1.03 
Equity Fund 0.146  0.83 -0.036  -0.23 -0.078  -0.53 
Insurance 0.530 *** 2.62 -0.106  -0.63 0.323 ** 2.05 
Investment Manager 0.534 *** 3.60 0.040  0.28 0.112  0.80 
Non-listed REIT 0.569 *** 3.67 0.100  0.59 0.118  0.79 
Pension Fund 0.654 *** 3.51 0.068  0.40 0.378 ** 2.41 
Private REIT 0.685 *** 4.20 0.139  0.89 -0.022  -0.14 
log(Building Size) 0.610 *** 5.46 1.098 *** 10.76 0.393 *** 4.46 
log(Land Size) 0.011  0.35 -0.129 *** -5.66 -0.047 ** -2.58 
Number of Floors -0.009  -1.35 0.006  1.02 0.020 *** 3.81 
Number of Units       0.006 *** 8.65 
Number of Units2       0.000 *** -6.16 
Typical Floor Size       0.000 ** -2.51 
Typical Floor Size2       0.000  1.21 
log(Age) -0.334 *** -3.57 -0.004  -0.03 -0.193 *** -3.77 
Exchange 0.154  1.40 0.136  1.06 -0.149 * -1.74 
81 
 
Distress -0.749 *** -9.31 -0.363 *** -3.98 -0.360 *** -5.82 
Property sub-type  Yes         
Cluster Yes (370 clusters) Yes (335 clusters) Yes (176 clusters) 
Year Yes   Yes   Yes   
          
N 1,218   1,222   748   
Adj. R2 0.69   0.80   0.82   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports property purchase price regression with characteristics matching 
procedure. Dependent variable is log of Sale Price. Premium indicates that one year lagged market-
wide PNAV average is positive. Investor type includes Equity Fund, Insurance, Investment 
Manager, Pension Fund, Private REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT. The reference buyer 
type is Listed REIT. Building Size and Land Size are in square feet (SF) and logged. Number of 
Floors is count. For multifamily properties, Number of Units (count) and Typical Floor Size (SF) 
enter with squared terms. Building classes are Class A, Class B and Class C and Class A is 
reference. Age is in years and logged. Exchange indicates 1031 Exchange transaction. Distress 
indicates sales with a remark of REO sale, auction sale, short sale, bankruptcy sale or distress sale. 
For retail properties, Property sub-type includes Airport Retail, Strip Center, Lifestyle Center, 
Neighborhood Center, Community Center, Outlet Center, Power Center, Regional Mall and Super 
Regional Mall. Sub-markets are included if there are at least 100 transactions during January 2001 
- December 2014. Clusters are indicators for matched groups. Matching procedure requires same 
Sub-market and building Class and other conditions. Transaction Year is controlled. 
 
An alternative to characteristic matched samples is the propensity score matching 
methodology, which is also used widely and in previous studies (Eichholtz, Kok and Quigley 2010, 
Wiley 2014, Wiley et al. 2014 and Liu, Gallimore and Wiley 2015). As a robustness check, the 
propensity score matching method is applied in place of the characteristic matched samples. 
Summary statistics after matching are reported in Table 28 and Table 29.   
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Table 28 ■ Property purchases by institutional investors (with propensity score matching). 
 Retail Office Multifamily 
 N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) 
Listed REIT 775 18,510 87,319 641 68,796 228,219 331 49,113 276,972 
Equity Fund 57 24,548 93,510 67 96,095 234,770 56 39,672 253,382 
Insurance 38 12,195 58,905 40 30,097 159,108 9 54,038 209,280 
Investment Manager 341 14,591 73,143 351 62,315 212,362 213 54,157 313,553 
Non-listed REIT 171 11,501 74,456 66 44,477 176,011 25 53,582 274,247 
Pension Fund 23 30,993 63,099 30 87,144 342,551 12 85,189 229,369 
Private REIT 145 8,984 55,325 87 33,906 156,782 16 21,841 438,688 
Total 1,550            1,282               662    
Notes: This table reports mean values for the property purchases by investor types after propensity score matching. Transactions were 
completed during January 2001-December 2014. Data is collected from CoStar. Listed REIT indicates publicly trading REITs. Data is 
limited to transactions with sale price of at least $50,000 and building size of at least 10,000 SF. Also, data includes only transactions 
that occurred in submarkets which have at least 100 transactions during the period. 
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Table 29 ■ Property purchase summary statistics (with propensity score matching). 
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Retail (N = 1,550) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 16,236 38,855 80 766,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 3.87 6.07 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 78,960 131,592 10,000 1,981,419 
Land Size (SF) 387,730 646,262 618 7,405,200 
Number of Floors 1.35 3.13 1 117 
Age 26.41 21.37 2 184 
Exchange 0.03    
Distress 0.05    
Listed REIT 0.50    
 
Panel B: Office (N = 1,282) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 64,050 140,481 105 2,800,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 3.88 6.55 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 217,203 298,448 10,000 2,652,712 
Land Size (SF) 249,91 491,028 317 8,058,600 
Number of Floors 8.78 10.72 1 65 
Age 33.53 27.63 1 166 
Class A 0.46    
Class B 0.46    
Class C 0.07    
Exchange 0.03    
Distress 0.03    
Listed REIT 0.50    
 
Panel C: Multifamily (N = 662) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 50,168 55,769 105 592,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 4.26 6.95 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 288,769 283,626 10,500 3,000,000 
Land Size (SF) 556,560 841,430 1,873 9,070,498 
Number of Floors 4.52 4.88 1 39 
Number of Units 281.63 273.32 5 3,221 
Typical Floor Size 84,920.69 81,241.42 7.00 802,018.00 
Age 27.37 23.35 2 123 
Class A 0.43    
Class B 0.42    
Class C 0.15    
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Exchange 0.07    
Distress 0.05    
Listed REIT 0.50    
Notes: This table reports summary statistics with propensity score matching procedure. Listed 
REIT indicates listed REIT buyer. 1tNAV  is market wide annual average of PNAVs collected 
from Green Street Advisors. Exchange indicates 1031 exchange transaction. Distress sale includes 
REO, auction, short sale, bankruptcy sale and any other distressed sales. Transactions were 
completed during January 2001-December 2014. Data is collected from CoStar. Data is limited to 
transactions with sale price of at least $50,000 and building size of at least 10,000 SF. Also, data 
includes only transactions that occurred in submarkets which have at least 100 transactions during 
the period. 
 
Empirical results based on the propensity score matched sample are provided in Table 30. 
Coefficients on market-wide PNAV ( 1 tNAVREITListed ) are positive and significant for office 
and multifamily. For retail, the coefficient is statistically insignificant but maintains positive sign. 
Overall, characteristics and propensity matching procedures produce similar results. 
Table 30 ■ Property purchase price regression (with propensity score matching). 
Dependent Retail Office Multifamily 
log(Sale Price) Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 1.365 *** 3.51 0.325  0.83 2.394 *** 4.06 

1 tNAVREITListed  0.006  1.14 0.015 *** 2.90 0.013 *** 2.68 
Equity Fund -0.159  -1.44 -0.068  -0.69 -0.110  -1.38 
Insurance -0.146  -1.12 -0.712 *** -6.10 0.108  0.66 
Investment Manager 0.044  0.69 -0.146 ** -2.36 0.001  0.01 
Non-listed REIT -0.180 ** -2.33 -0.005  -0.05 0.194 * 1.87 
Pension Fund 0.634 *** 3.89 0.136  1.01 0.396 *** 2.69 
Private REIT 0.105  1.25 0.095  1.08 -0.599 *** -4.46 
log(Building Size) 0.763 *** 22.88 0.949 *** 29.17 0.658 *** 13.62 
log(Land Size) 0.010  0.41 -0.098 *** -4.82 -0.040  -1.64 
Number of Floors 0.007  1.24 0.004  1.23 0.024 *** 4.33 
Number of Units       0.002 *** 6.14 
Number of Units2       0.000 *** -5.77 
Typical Floor Size       0.000  1.56 
Typical Floor Size2       0.000 *** -3.37 
Class B    -0.229 *** -4.51 -0.101 ** -2.09 
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Class C    -0.410 *** -4.43 -0.439 *** -6.34 
log(Age) -0.350 *** -12.95 -0.172 *** -5.34 -0.152 *** -5.25 
Exchange 0.025  0.23 0.052  0.47 0.067  0.88 
Distress -0.822 *** -8.75 -0.469 *** -4.38 -0.350 *** -3.92 
Property sub-type  Yes         
Submarket Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Yes   Yes   Yes   
          
N 1,550   1,282   662   
Adj. R2 0.64   0.80   0.80   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports property purchase price regression with propensity score matching 
procedure. Dependent variable is log of Sale Price. 1tNAV  is one year lagged market-wide PNAV 
average. Investor type includes Equity Fund, Insurance, Investment Manager, Pension Fund, 
Private REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT. The reference buyer type is Listed REIT. Building 
Size and Land Size are in square feet (SF) and logged. Number of Floors is count. For multifamily 
properties, Number of Units (count) and Typical Floor Size (SF) enter with squared terms. Building 
classes are Class A, Class B and Class C and Class A is reference. Age is in years and logged. 
Exchange indicates 1031 Exchange transaction. Distress indicates sales with a remark of REO sale, 
auction sale, short sale, bankruptcy sale or distress sale. For retail properties, Property sub-type 
includes Airport Retail, Strip Center, Lifestyle Center, Neighborhood Center, Community Center, 
Outlet Center, Power Center, Regional Mall and Super Regional Mall. Sub-markets are included 
if there are at least 100 transactions during January 2001 - December 2014. Clusters are indicators 
for matched groups. Matching procedure requires same Sub-market and building Class and other 
conditions. Transaction Year is controlled. 
 
 
4.4.3 Property Sale Price with Matching 
Property dispositions by REIT managers may not be as competitive as property purchases due to 
management fee structures and the dealer rule. As a consequence, the market-wide PNAV is not 
expected to have a significant impact on the selling side. Property sales summary statistics for the 
characteristic matched samples are provided in Table 31 and Table 32. 
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Table 31 ■ Property sales by institutional investors (with characteristics matching). 
 Retail Office Multifamily 
 N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) N 
Price 
($1,000) 
Building 
Size (SF) 
Listed REIT 72 6,957 68,011 72 53,715 222,578 38 54,116 327,828 
Equity Fund 18 18,014 81,044 18 49,927 159,996 9 29,388 237,025 
Insurance 6 5,138 39,152 7 53,927 257,570 5 81,890 297,474 
Investment Manager 75 20,211 60,935 102 54,979 185,667 46 43,260 327,931 
Non-listed REIT 6 10,478 51,665 4 42,181 246,921 10 55,825 356,758 
Pension Fund 2 9,590 37,913 11 78,009 181,780 3 86,433 336,685 
Private REIT 7 4,906 29,016 9 18,816 113,493 6 27,025 287,140 
Total 186    223   117   
Notes: This table reports mean values for the property sales by investor types after characteristics matching. Transactions were completed 
during January 2001-December 2014. Data is collected from CoStar. Listed REIT indicates publicly trading REITs. Data is limited to 
transactions with sale price of at least $50,000 and building size of at least 10,000 SF. Also, data includes only transactions that occurred 
in submarkets which have at least 100 transactions during the period. 
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Table 32 ■ Property sales summary statistics (with characteristics matching). 
  Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Retail (N = 186) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 13,377 30,349 299 241,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 3.34 6.32 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 63,169 75,072 10,017 726,674 
Land Size (SF) 325,183 683,730 20,494 8,058,600 
Number of Floors 1.26 0.74 1 5 
Age 20.99 9.69 4 47 
Exchange 0.02    
Distress 0.11    
Listed REIT 0.39    
 
Panel B: Office (N = 223) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 53,577 68,327 69 576,000 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 2.78 6.01 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 195,763 236,292 16,047 2,652,712 
Land Size (SF) 237,182 268,591 1,306 1,947,132 
Number of Floors 8.29 8 1 54 
Age 28.87 17.17 6 112 
Class A 0.57    
Class B 0.42    
Class C 0.01    
Exchange 0.04    
Distress 0.04    
Listed REIT 0.32    
 
Panel C: Multifamily (N = 117) 
Sale Price ($1,000) 48,717.84 42,958 1,970 262,500 

1 tNAVREITListed  (%) 2.33 6.76 -13.53 20.96 
Building Size (SF) 320,200 146,171 110,707 1,078,800 
Land Size (SF) 709,583 561,337 34,412 2,625,883 
Number of Floors 3.63 3.39 1 33 
Number of Units 324.72 143.15 112 937 
Typical Floor Size 104,851 68,926 1,308 456,511 
Age 22.27 11.67 3 51 
Class A 0.41    
Class B 0.52    
Class C 0.07    
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Exchange 0.01    
Distress 0.07    
Listed REIT 0.32    
Notes: This table reports summary statistics with characteristics matching procedure. Listed REIT 
indicates listed REIT seller. 1tNAV  is market wide annual average of PNAVs collected from 
Green Street Advisors. Exchange indicates 1031 exchange transaction. Distress sale includes REO, 
auction, short sale, bankruptcy sale and any other distressed sales. Transactions were completed 
during January 2001-December 2014. Data is collected from CoStar. Data is limited to transactions 
with sale price of at least $50,000 and building size of at least 10,000 SF. Also, data includes only 
transactions that occurred in submarkets which have at least 100 transactions during the period. 
 
Estimations for the property sale price are reported in Table 33. Market-wide PNAV 
( 1 tNAVREITListed ) has no significant impact on sale price. Sale prices attained by REIT 
managers in disposition are not significantly different for those attained by other institutional 
investors. The only exception is pension funds, which achieve higher selling price in the 
multifamily sector. 
Table 33 ■ Property sale price regression (with characteristics matching). 
Dependent Retail Office Multifamily 
log(Sale Price) Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value Coeff.  t-value 
Intercept 6.209  1.30 -1.382  -0.32 4.727  1.05 

1 tNAVREITListed  0.028  1.13 0.000  0.02 0.007  0.86 
Equity Fund 0.108  0.24 -0.439  -1.63 -0.092  -0.53 
Insurance 0.097  0.17 -0.554  -1.63 0.363  1.32 
Investment Manager 0.349  1.17 -0.006  -0.04 -0.039  -0.32 
Non-listed REIT 0.520  0.93 0.113  0.25 0.012  0.08 
Pension Fund 0.939  1.07 0.252  0.90 0.430 * 1.71 
Private REIT 0.921  1.62 -0.037  -0.11 -0.174  -0.94 
log(Building Size) 0.563  1.25 1.098 *** 3.33 0.613  1.65 
log(Land Size) -0.027  -0.14 -0.163 ** -2.41 -0.222 *** -2.80 
Number of Floors 0.642 *** 3.39 0.000  -0.02 0.017  1.36 
Number of Units       0.005 ** 2.52 
Number of Units2       0.000 ** -2.21 
Typical Floor Size       0.000  0.09 
Typical Floor Size2       0.000  0.45 
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log(Age) -1.469 ** -2.47 0.239  0.43 -0.103  -0.36 
Exchange 0.119  0.19 0.471  1.59 1.010  1.31 
Distress -0.726 ** -2.16 -0.580 ** -2.11 -0.437 ** -2.27 
Property sub-type  Yes         
Cluster Yes (72 clusters) Yes (72 clusters) Yes (38 clusters) 
Year Yes   Yes   Yes   
          
N 186   223   117   
Adj. R2 0.51   0.81   0.89   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports property sale price regression with characteristics matching procedure. 
Dependent variable is log of Sale Price. 1tNAV  is one year lagged market-wide PNAV average. 
Seller investor type includes Equity Fund, Insurance, Investment Manager, Pension Fund, Private 
REIT, Non-listed REIT and Listed REIT. The reference seller type is Listed REIT. Building Size 
and Land Size are in square feet (SF) and logged. Number of Floors is count. For multifamily 
properties, Number of Units (count) and Typical Floor Size (SF) enter with squared terms. Building 
classes are Class A, Class B and Class C and Class A is reference. Age is in years and logged. 
Exchange indicates 1031 Exchange transaction. Distress indicates sales with a remark of REO sale, 
auction sale, short sale, bankruptcy sale or distress sale. For retail properties, Property sub-type 
includes Airport Retail, Strip Center, Lifestyle Center, Neighborhood Center, Community Center, 
Outlet Center, Power Center, Regional Mall and Super Regional Mall. Sub-markets are included 
if there are at least 100 transactions during January 2001 - December 2014. Clusters are indicators 
for matched groups. Matching procedure requires same Sub-market and building Class and other 
conditions. Transaction Year is controlled. 
 
This section covers the impact of market-wide PNAV on REITs property purchase prices. 
Hypothesis 3 is confirmed and listed REIT managers appear to pay higher price for a property 
when there is a market-wide premium to NAV in REIT shares. However, listed REITs do not 
typically pay higher price compared to other institutional investors – supporting Hypothesis 4. 
 
4.5 Equity Issuance (Hypothesis 5) 
In the general finance literature, SEO announcements are typically followed by negative stock 
price reactions (Asquith and Mullins 1986, for example). However, REITs are cash-constrained 
due to dividend payout requirement and it is necessary for REITs to access the capital markets in 
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order to raise capital for new investment. Consequently, the negative stock price reaction is 
somewhat diminished in the REIT sector (Howe and Shilling 1988, for example). SEO 
announcements that occur during periods when REIT share prices trade at a premium to NAV may 
signal favorable information to the stock market, such as opportunities for new investment. If privy 
to the opportunity faced by REIT managers, investors may react more favorably to SEO 
announcements that occur when share prices trade at a premium to NAV than when share trade at 
a discount to NAV. 
 
4.5.1 Purpose of Equity Issuance 
As an initial step in this line of research, I investigated the stated intended purpose of the SEO to 
determine whether REIT SEOs are related to new investment opportunities. One approach to do 
this is to analyze the stated intended purpose using regular expression search. Intended purposes 
are categorized as Table 34 depending on the contained expressions. 
Table 34 ■ Category of intended purpose of SEOs. 
Category Contained expressions 
General Purpose general purpose, working capital 
Capital Structuring capital (re)structure, borrow, debt, credit, repayment, repurchase, 
reduction, pay down, pay off, retire, redemption 
Property Acquisition acquisition, purchase, buy property, buy real estate, invest property, 
invest real estate 
Development development 
Operating Partnership OP unit, operating partnership 
Capital Expenditure capital expenditure, capital improvement 
Notes: This table categorizes the intended purpose of SEOs. Regular expression search is applied 
and expressions similar to contained expressions are categorized into a purpose. For example, 
expressions “general purpose” and “general operational purpose” are all categorized into general 
purpose. On the other hand, “repurchase” is categorized into capital structuring while “purchase” 
falls into property acquisition. 
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Table 35 summarizes the categories of stated intended purpose for REIT SEOs. In Panel 
A, 674 (out of 1,021) SEOs express the intended use of offering proceeds will go to property 
acquisitions. However, a large number of announcements mention multiple purposes and only 45 
announcements were stated exclusively for property acquisitions. Panel B shows that more than 
80% of announcements include two or more purposes. Thus, the depth of analysis for intended use 
of SEO proceeds is somewhat limited due to multiple explanations and potentially confounding 
implications. 
Table 35 ■ SEO intended purpose. 
Panel A: SEO announcements by purpose. 
Purpose Inclusive Exclusive Exclusive Ratio (%) 
General 783 26 3.32  
Capital Structure 853 99 11.61  
Property Acquisition 674 45 6.68  
Development 235 1 0.43  
Operating Partnership 178 0 0.00  
Capital Expenditure 75 0 0.00  
 
Panel B: SEO announcements by number of purposes. 
Number of purposes Count %  
1 171 16.75  
2 294 28.80  
3 275 26.93  
4 200 19.59  
5 72 7.05  
6 9 0.88  
Total 1,021 100  
Notes: This table shows the breakdown of SEO intended purposes. SEO announcements were 
made during January 2001 to December 2014. Inclusive indicates that the SEO purpose statement 
includes at least one specific purpose while Exclusive indicates that SEO purpose statement 
exclusively includes only specific purpose.  
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To expand on the linkage between SEOs and property acquisitions, I examine the level of 
REIT acquisitions surrounding the SEO announcement date in Figure 7, tallied in dollar amount 
and property count. Month zero is the SEO announcement date. Acquisition activity increases 
substantially following SEO announcements for a sustained period beyond 12 months. 
Figure 7 ■ Property acquisitions surrounding SEO announcements. 
 
Note: This figure displays property acquisitions surrounding SEO announcements. Month zero 
indicates the announcement month. Property acquisition value (in $billion) and count are 
aggregated for all the announcing firms up to ±36 months from the announcement month. 
 
Table 36 summarizes the SEO gross offering amounts. There are 961 announcements from 197 
REITs with data available and the average offering size is $216 million. 
Table 36 ■ SEO gross amount offered. 
 N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gross Amount Offered 
($ million) 
961 
(197 REITs) 216 362 0 6,300 
Notes: This table reports the summary statistics of SEO gross amount offered in $ million. 
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Table 37 compares the property acquisitions before and after the SEO announcements. On 
average, during 12-month period following the SEO announcement, REIT managers increase 
property purchases by $48 million (36% increase) or 8.5 properties compared to the 12-month pre-
announcement period. During the 24-month period following the announcement, property 
purchases increase by $81 million or 19.6 properties compared to 24-month period leading up to 
the announcement. The results suggest that REIT’s equity issuances are followed by a significant 
increase in property acquisitions. 
Table 37 ■ Property acquisitions surrounding SEOs. 
  Value ($ million)  Count 
12 
months 
 Pre Post Post - Pre  Pre Post Post - Pre 
N 521   N 1,522   
Mean 135 183 48*** 
(3.59) 
Mean 28.95 37.48 8.53** 
(2.02) 
24 
months 
 
 Pre Post Post - Pre  Pre Post Post - Pre 
N 327   N 1,522   
Mean 216 297 81*** 
(3.06) 
Mean 52.15 71.71 19.56** 
(2.34) 
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the mean property acquisitions of pre- and post-SEO announcements. 
Property acquisition values are in $ million and count is number of properties purchased. Pre (Post) 
indicates 12- or 24-month period before (after) the announcement. 
 
4.5.2 Premium to NAV and SEO Shock 
This subsection examines the stock price shock following the SEO announcements in relation to 
PNAV. Figure 8 displays average CAR surrounding SEO announcements for the event window of 
±90 days. The solid line represents abnormal returns for firms with shares that trade at a premium 
on the announcement date, while the dotted line represents abnormal returns for firms with shares 
that trade at a discount to NAV on the announcement date. Both premium and discount firms 
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experience share price reductions following the SEO announcement. There are notable differences 
between the two groups. Premium firms announce SEO when their shares are fully appreciated 
and show no additional significant abnormal returns. On the other hand, discount firms announce 
SEO while their shares are gaining momentum. Following the announcement, premium firms 
experience almost no abnormal returns while discount firms regain momentum after a while. This 
higher abnormal return of discount firms in the long-term is similar to Gentry, Jones and Mayer 
(2004) who find substantial positive excess returns in the strategy of buying discount firms and 
shorting premium firms. 
Figure 8 ■ Average cumulative abnormal returns surrounding SEO announcements. 
 
Note: This figure displays average abnormal return surrounding seasoned equity offerings (SEO) 
for time window of (-90, +90). Day zero indicates the announcement date. Solid and dotted line 
represent the average cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of REITs which announced SEO at a 
share price premium and discount, respectively. 
 
Following the SEO announcement, CARs are investigated for time windows of short-term, 
(0, +1) and (0, +2); intermediate-term, (-15, -3) and (+3, +15); long-term, (+3, +60) and (+16, +60). 
First, short-term CAR is investigated for event windows (0, +1) and (0, +2). Table 38 reports mean 
CAR for premium and discount firms. For the (0, +1) window, premium firms experience 0.87% 
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stock price drop while discount firms experience 0.95% drop on average. For the (0, +2) window, 
premium firms experience 0.88% negative stock price reactions while discount firms experience 
1.05% negative reactions. These return differences between the two groups are statistically 
insignificant.   
Table 38 ■ Short-term CAR. 
Window CAR(0, +1)  CAR(0, +2) 
 N Mean  Mean 
All 1,238 -0.90 
(-9.40) 
***  -0.95 
(-9.55) 
*** 
Premium 734 -0.87 
(-10.88) 
***  -0.88 
(-9.71) 
*** 
Discount 504 -0.95 
(-4.65) 
***  -1.05 
(-5.11) 
*** 
Difference 
 
0.09 
(0.40) 
 
 
 0.17 
(0.76) 
 
 
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the mean of CARs for the time window of (l, u). Premium and Discount 
indicate the firms announced SEO when their shares trade at a premium and discount, respectively. 
Differences test differences between premium and discount groups. t-test statistics are in 
parentheses. Returns are in percentage. 
 
The short-term relationship between stock price reactions and PNAV is investigated in 
greater depth in the analyses reported in Table 39. The dependent variable in the estimations is 
CAR(0, +1) and CAR(0, +2). PNAV has no impact on the subsequent abnormal returns following 
the SEO announcement. Consistent with evidence provided in Brounen and Eichholtz (2001), 
firms with larger offer size experience more severe negative stock price reactions, and those with 
higher debt ratios experience less severe negative reactions. The results in Table 38 and Table 39 
suggest that, in the short-term, REIT stock investors are unaffected by information about the share 
premiums to NAV when reacting to the SEO announcement. 
Table 39 ■ Short-term cumulative abnormal return regression. 
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Window CAR(0, +1)  CAR(0, +2) 
 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
Intercept -1.52  -1.47  -1.22  -1.19 

1, tiNAV  -0.01  -1.25  -0.01  -0.74 
Offer Size Ratio -4.38 *** -6.17  -4.54 *** -6.42 
Debt Equity Ratio 0.26 *** 2.80  0.12  1.25 
Property Type Yes    Yes   
Year Yes    Yes   
        
N 732     732   
R2 0.07    0.09   
Adj. R2 0.04    0.06   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports abnormal return regression results. Dependent variable CAR(l, u) 
indicates CAR during given time window of (l, u).  

1, tiNAV  is PNAV one-month prior to SEO 
announcement month t . Offer Size Ratio is gross offer amount divided by pre-offer market 
capitalization of the firm and Debt Equity Ratio is pre-offer total debt divided by pre-offer market 
capitalization of the firm. Property Type and Year fixed effects are controlled. 
 
In the next step, intermediate-term CARs surrounding the SEO announcement date are 
investigated with results presented in Table 40. During the pre-announcement (-15, -3) window, 
premium firms experience 0.15% CAR which is statistically insignificant from zero. Discount 
firms exhibit significant share price appreciation of 1.02%. During post-announcement (+3, +15) 
window, both premium and discount firms have abnormal returns that are insignificant from zero. 
The third column in Table 40 tests the difference between pre- and post-announcement periods. 
Premium firms do not lose momentum while discount firm lose significant momentum of 0.96%.  
Table 40 ■ Intermediate-term CAR. 
Window  Pre-announcement 
CAR(-15, -3) 
 
Post-announcement 
CAR(+3, +15) 
 
 N Mean  Mean Difference 
All 1,232 0.51 
(3.55) 
***  0.05 
(0.41) 
 
 
0.46 
(2.43) 
** 
Premium 731 0.15   0.05  0.11  
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(1.26) (0.36)  (0.58)  
Discount 501 1.02 
(3.39) 
***  0.06 
(0.24) 
 
 
0.96 
(2.57) 
*** 
Difference 
 
-0.87 
(-2.68) 
***  -0.01 
(-0.04) 
 
 
  
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the mean of CARs for the time window of (l, u). Premium and Discount 
indicate the firms announced SEO when their shares trade at a premium and discount, respectively. 
Premium and discount group difference is non-paired t-test, and pre- and post- announcement 
group difference test is paired t-test. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
Intermediate-term CAR is analyzed in the results in Table 41. During the pre-announcement period, 

1, tiNAV  (PNAV one-month prior to announcement) has negative impact on CAR (column 1). A 
high PNAV may signal overvaluation in the share price resulting in lower CAR. During the post-
announcement period, 

1, tiNAV  has positive sign (column 2) indicating that higher PNVA firms 
have greater abnormal returns following the SEO announcement. In column 3, the dependent 
variable is momentum loss which is CAR(-15, -3) minus CAR(+3, +15). The coefficient on PNAV 
is negative and significant implying that lower PNAV firms lose more stock price appreciation 
momentum following the announcement. The results in Table 40 and Table 41 suggest that, in the 
intermediate-term, discount firms lose their stock return momentum following the SEO 
announcements. 
Table 41 ■ Intermediate-term cumulative abnormal return regression. 
Window (1) 
CAR(-15, -3) 
(2) 
CAR(+3, +15) 
(3) 
(1) – (2) 
 Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value 
Intercept 0.51  0.39 0.34  0.32 0.17  0.10 

1, tiNAV  -0.03 
** -2.51 0.03 ** 2.43 -0.06 *** -3.56 
Offer Size Ratio -0.39  -0.43 1.94 *** 2.64 -2.33 ** -2.05 
Debt Equity Ratio 0.05  0.43 -0.24 ** -2.53 0.30 ** 1.98 
Property Type Yes   Yes   Yes   
Year Yes   Yes   Yes   
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N 732    732   732   
R2 0.03   0.09   0.05   
Adj. R2 0.00   0.06   0.02   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports abnormal return regression results. Dependent variable CAR(l, u) 
indicates CAR during given time window of (l, u). In column 3, dependent variable is CAR(-15, -
3) minus CAR(+3, +15). 

1, tiNAV  is PNAV one-month prior to SEO announcement month t . Offer 
Size Ratio is gross offer amount divided by pre-offer market capitalization of the firm and Debt 
Equity Ratio is pre-offer total debt divided by pre-offer market capitalization of the firm. Property 
Type and Year fixed effects are controlled. 
 
Finally, the long-term following the announcements are investigated for the windows of 
(+3, +60) and (+16, +60) which is inclusive and exclusive of intermediate-term, respectively. 
Table 42 reports mean CARs5. Discount firms experience significant positive CAR of 1.60% and 
1.49% for time windows (+3, +60) and (+16, +60) respectively while premium firms do not show 
significant abnormal returns. Relative to premium firms, discount firms gain abnormal returns of 
1.69 to 1.75%. Over the long-term, discount firms are able gain stock price momentum following 
SEO announcements. 
Table 42 ■ Long-term CAR. 
Window  CAR(+3, +60) CAR(+16, +60) 
 N  Mean 
All 1,203 0.56 
(1.94) 
* 0.49 
(1.92) 
* 
Premium 716 -0.15 
(-0.56) 
 -0.19 
(-0.81) 
 
Discount 487 1.60 
(2.73) 
*** 1.49 
(2.85) 
*** 
Difference 
(discount minus premium) 
 
1.75 
(2.71) 
*** 1.69 
(2.94) 
*** 
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
                                                 
5 For long-term post-announcement CAR, regression analysis is not applied since the capital structure of the firm has 
been impacted as a result of SEO over the long-term period. 
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Notes: This table reports the mean of CARs for the time window of (l, u). Premium and Discount 
indicate the firms announced SEO when their shares trade at a premium and discount, respectively. 
Differences between discount and premium firms are reported with test t-statistics in parentheses.  
 
This section has covered whether REIT stock investors are aware of pricing differentials 
when they react to SEO announcements. Following SEO announcements, both premium and 
discount firms experience similar magnitude negative stock price reactions in the short-term. In 
the intermediate-term, discount firms lose significant stock price return momentum which is 
regained over a longer horizon. The evidence considered in this analysis is not conclusive in its 
capacity to suggest that REIT investors react favorably to SEO announcements that occur when 
shares trade at a premium to NAV. There is insufficient evidence to support Hypothesis 5. 
 
4.6 Drivers of Pricing Differentials 
This section explores the determinants of NAV spreads at the firm level. Specifically, I investigate 
the concentration of property holdings in major commercial real estate markets and the role of 
REIT profitability. The regression results are presented in Table 43. In models (1) and (2), the 
estimated coefficient for Major Share is positive and significant. REITs with greater allocations 
to the major markets are more likely to experience share price premiums to NAV – enhancing 
opportunities to exploit inter-market arbitrage. Estimated coefficients for EBIT Ratio are also 
positive and significant. More profitable firms experience greater share price premiums to NAV. 
Larger REITs tend to trade at premium, consistent with Capozza and Lee (1995). Results for 
leverage and firm age are insignificant. 
Table 43 ■ Determinants of PNAV. 
Dependent 
Variable 
(1) 
PNAV 
 
 
(2) 
Relative PNAV 
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 Coeff. t-value  Coeff. t-value 
Intercept -30.88 *** -4.65  -32.43 *** -9.32 
Major Share 4.79 *** 3.43  3.43 ** 2.20 
EBIT Ratio 91.63 *** 6.32  159.51 *** 10.92 
Cash Ratio -4.38  -0.44  -5.76  -0.52 
Firm Size 2.95 *** 8.52  2.85 *** 7.35 
Debt Ratio -7.21 *** -2.84  -4.16  -1.49 
Firm Age -0.02  -0.47  -0.12 *** -3.15 
Property 
Type 
Yes 
  
 Yes 
  
Year Yes    No   
        
 N 1,153    1,153   
Adj. R2 0.53    0.28   
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports the regression result for causes of PNAV. PNAV = share price/NAV -1 
and Relative PNAV = individual firm’s PNAV - market wide average PNAV. Major share is the 
number of properties in the major market (Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New 
York and DC) relative to all property holdings. EBIT Ratio is EBIT to total assets ratio, Cash Ratio 
is cash to total assets ratio, Firm Size is log of total assets, Debt Ratio is debt to total assets ratio 
and Firm Age is age of the firm in years. Property Type and Year indicate the property type and 
year fixed effect controls. 
 
Stock market investor sentiment may contribute to deviations between NAV and stock 
market valuations. In this dissertation, investor sentiment is proxied by real estate mutual fund 
flows. Figure 9 displays correlations between real estate mutual fund flow (
htFlow  ) and PNAV 
( tPNAV ) with choice of lags h . The horizontal axis represents lags in real estate mutual fund flow. 
The two series are characterized by significant positive correlations with up to 6 months lead in 
mutual fund flows. Stock market investor sentiment, proxied by real estate mutual fund flows, can 
create inflated stock market valuations, which appears to lead PNAV outcomes. 
Figure 9 ■ Fund flow and PNAV cross correlation functions. 
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Note: This figure displays cross correlation functions of real estate mutual fund flows (
htFlow  ) 
vs. PNAV (
tPNAV ) with different lags. Horizontal axis represents lags in real estate mutual fund 
flow ( h ). Dashed line is for ±95% confidence interval. 
 
Granger causality between PNAV and fund flows is tested with results reported in Table 44.  
Table 44 ■ Fund flow and PNAV Granger causality test. 
Lag order 1 2 4 6 
PNAV  Flow  0.09  1.52  1.02  0.87  
Flow  PNAV 14.84 *** 10.27 *** 5.50 *** 3.94 *** 
Significance codes: * P < 0.1;  ** P < 0.05;  *** P < 0.01 
Notes: This table reports Granger causality test F statistics with various lag order. PNAV  Flow 
and Flow  PNAV indicate PNAV Granger causes real estate mutual fund flow vice versa. 
 
The results in Table 44 suggest that real estate mutual fund flows Granger causes PNAV but the 
reverse is not true. Thus, PNAV is influenced by stock market investor sentiment, as proxied by 
mutual fund flows. 
The determinants of PNAV deviations are investigated in this section. The findings suggest 
that greater allocations in major commercial real estate markets, enhanced firm profitability and 
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positive investor sentiment in the stock market are contributing factors to REIT share price trading 
at a premium to NAV.  
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CHAPTER FIVE ─ CONCLUSION 
Public and private dual asset markets are unique to real estate. The two markets often deviate from 
each other in the valuation of the underlying assets. This dissertation enhances our understanding 
of the consequences from pricing differentials, with implications for property investors, REIT 
stock investors and researchers. The central idea behind the dissertation is that REIT managers are 
uniquely positioned to exploit positive “arbitrage” between the two markets. However, arbitrage 
in the dual market system involves significant risks and amount of time involved with issuing 
equity and participating in property transactions. The dissertation evaluates whether REIT 
managers attempt to exploit the inter-market arbitrages despite the risks and whether REIT stock 
investors are aware of potential signaling that results from related actions. Specifically, this 
dissertation examines three main research questions surrounding asset pricing differentials. 
First, REIT managers’ property investment activities are investigated. When REIT shares 
trade at a premium to NAV, REIT managers can realize positive arbitrage by issuing new equities 
in the public market, and by purchasing properties in the property markets where assets are valued 
relatively low by the stock market. Conversely, when REIT shares trade at discount to NAV, 
positive arbitrage can be achieved by selling assets in the property market (which is overvalued by 
the stock market) and redistributing the proceeds to shareholders. The results provided in this 
dissertation suggest that REIT managers tend to increase property purchases by 3-4% during 
periods when REIT shares trade at a premium to NAV, and they increase property dispositions by 
around 2% during periods when share prices are below NAV.  
Inter-market arbitrages can also be accomplished at the firm level. A private real estate 
firm may choose to go public if they anticipate premiums to NAV in the public equity market. 
During 2001 to 2014, REIT IPOs were significantly more likely to occur during periods when the 
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sector experienced market-wide premiums to NAV. On the other hand, a listed REIT may elect to 
go private during periods when shares trade at discount to NAV. The results suggest that REITs 
are more likely to become M&A targets during periods when share prices are discounted to NAV. 
Second, I investigate the property purchase price paid by REIT managers. If the REIT 
sector as a whole is experiencing market-wide premiums to NAV, competition among REIT 
managers for desirable acquisitions may bid up property values – particularly when REIT 
acquisitions represent a sufficiently large component of the transactions market. The evidence 
provided suggests that REIT managers pay higher prices for property purchases when premium to 
NAV is a market-wide phenomenon. Under the average market-wide premium to NAV (4.3%), 
REIT managers pay estimated premiums of 8.1%, 4.7% and 3.8% to acquire retail, office and 
multifamily assets, respectively. However, the market-wide premium to NAV has no impact on 
divestiture prices. 
Previous studies document that REITs pay premiums of up to 27% to purchase properties 
when compared to other investors. To address the potential sample selection issue, this dissertation 
adopts data matching methodology and compares only institutional investor types. In contrast to 
the findings of previous studies, REIT managers are not observed to pay higher transaction prices 
in acquisitions – absent periods of premiums to NAV. The occasions when REIT managers appear 
to pay relatively higher prices than other investors coincide with market-wide premiums to NAV. 
Finally, I examine whether REIT stock investors are aware of REIT managers’ attempt to 
exploit the inter-market arbitrage. Firms generally experience negative stock price reactions 
following SEO announcements. However, REITs are cash-constrained in nature and SEOs are 
commonly utilized for new investment opportunities. If REIT managers announce SEOs during 
periods when shares trade at a premium to NAV, it may signal positive arbitrage opportunities to 
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shareholders. Consequently, SEOs that occur during periods when shares trade at a premium to 
NAV might be expected to receive less severe negative price reactions. To identify the differences 
in reactions to SEO announcements, firms announcing during premium to NAV (premium firms) 
are compared to firms announcing during discount (discount firms). 
The findings suggest that REIT investors are indifferent to whether shares trade at a 
premium or discount to NAV when reacting to the SEO signal. Over the initial two days following 
the SEO announcement, both premium and discount firms experience negative price in similar 
magnitude. During the intermediate term (15-days pre- and post-announcement), discount firms 
lose 0.96% stock price momentum following SEOs while premium firms appear to have no 
abnormal returns in both pre- and post-announcement periods. In the long-term (60-day post-
announcement), discount firms regain momentum around 1.5 to 1.6%, while premium firms 
experience no significant change. In summary, there is a lack of compelling evidence that REIT 
investors respond more favorably to SEO announcements that occur when share prices trade at a 
premium to NAV. 
 Taken together, this dissertation contributes to our knowledge in a small but growing area 
of literature on real estate inter-market pricing differentials. Specifically, this research explores the 
consequences of pricing differentials both in the property markets and public markets. Inter-market 
arbitrage opportunities have a strong theoretic foundation, yet limited investigation has been 
conducted on this topic. Among industry practitioners, the pricing differential metric, PNAV, is 
becoming increasingly visible in its application to explain REIT property investment opportunities, 
IPOs, SEOs, M&A activity and more. Yet, thus far, there is a lack of research to support the 
meaningfulness of related actions by REIT managers. This dissertation provides seminal evidence 
toward that end.  
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